Natural Resources, Weak States and Civil War : Can Rents Stabilize Coup Prone Regimes?

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dc.creatorBodea, Cristina
dc.date2012-06-29T21:56:29Z
dc.date2012-06-29T21:56:29Z
dc.date2012-05
dc.date.accessioned2026-07-01T01:03:21Z
dc.descriptionThis paper argues that state weakness is broader than implied previously in the civil war literature, and that particular types of weakness in interaction with natural resources have aggravating or mitigating consequences for the risk of civil war. While in anocracies or unstable regimes natural resources can be expected to increase the risk of civil war, we suggest that resource wealth allows weak leaders to stabilize their relationship with their inner elite circle. In particular, for regimes at risk of coup d'etat, the availability of substantial resources is more likely to be channeled in ways that deter rebellion, plausibly countering the grievances generated by natural resources and rebels' viewing of such resources as a prize for taking over the state. Data from 1946-2003 and multiple empirical operationalizations broadly support our argument. These findings are consistent with work showing that resource rents can induce stability in state - society relationships.
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dc.formattext/plain
dc.identifierhttp://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2012/05/16271733/natural-resources-weak-states-civil-war-can-rents-stabilize-coup-prone-regimes
dc.identifierhttps://hdl.handle.net/10986/9350
dc.identifierhttps://doi.org/10.1596/1813-9450-6071
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/123456789/414773
dc.languageEnglish
dc.publisherWorld Bank, Washington, DC
dc.relationPolicy Research Working Paper; No. 6071
dc.rightsCC BY 3.0 IGO
dc.rightshttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo/
dc.rightsWorld Bank
dc.subjectACCOUNTING
dc.subjectALLOCATION OF RESOURCES
dc.subjectARMED CONFLICT
dc.subjectARMED CONFLICTS
dc.subjectARMS
dc.subjectBANKS
dc.subjectBARGAINING
dc.subjectBATTLE
dc.subjectCITIZENS
dc.subjectCIVIL CONFLICT
dc.subjectCIVIL SOCIETY
dc.subjectCIVIL WAR
dc.subjectCIVIL WARS
dc.subjectCOLD WAR
dc.subjectCOLLECTIVE ACTION
dc.subjectCONFLICT RESOLUTION
dc.subjectCOUNTERINSURGENCY
dc.subjectCOUPS D'ETAT
dc.subjectDEATHS
dc.subjectDEBT
dc.subjectDEMOCRACY
dc.subjectDEPENDENCE
dc.subjectDEVELOPING COUNTRIES
dc.subjectDEVELOPMENT POLICY
dc.subjectDISCRIMINATION
dc.subjectECONOMIC GROWTH
dc.subjectECONOMICS
dc.subjectENERGY CONSUMPTION
dc.subjectENTREPRENEURS
dc.subjectETHNIC DISCRIMINATION
dc.subjectETHNIC GROUP
dc.subjectETHNIC GROUPS
dc.subjectEXPLOITATION
dc.subjectFIGHTING
dc.subjectFOUNDATIONS
dc.subjectINCOME
dc.subjectINFORMATION EXCHANGE
dc.subjectINTERNATIONAL BANK
dc.subjectINTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT
dc.subjectINTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION
dc.subjectINTERNATIONAL SECURITY
dc.subjectMILITARY EXPENDITURES
dc.subjectMILITARY FORCES
dc.subjectMILITARY REGIMES
dc.subjectMILITARY SPENDING
dc.subjectNATIONS
dc.subjectNATURAL RESOURCE
dc.subjectNATURAL RESOURCES
dc.subjectPEACE
dc.subjectPEACE RESEARCH
dc.subjectPOLARIZATION
dc.subjectPOLICE
dc.subjectPOLICY DISCUSSIONS
dc.subjectPOLICY RESEARCH
dc.subjectPOLICY RESEARCH WORKING PAPER
dc.subjectPOLITICAL INSTABILITY
dc.subjectPOLITICAL INSTITUTIONS
dc.subjectPOLITICAL POWER
dc.subjectPOLITICAL SYSTEMS
dc.subjectPOLITICAL VIOLENCE
dc.subjectPOPULATION SIZE
dc.subjectPROGRESS
dc.subjectPROPERTY RIGHTS
dc.subjectQUANTITATIVE MEASURES
dc.subjectREBEL
dc.subjectREBEL ARMY
dc.subjectREBELS
dc.subjectRECONSTRUCTION
dc.subjectRENTS
dc.subjectREVOLUTION
dc.subjectREVOLUTIONS
dc.subjectRIOT
dc.subjectRIOTS
dc.subjectSOCIAL STRUCTURE
dc.subjectSOLDIERS
dc.subjectSTATE UNIVERSITY
dc.subjectVIOLENT CONFLICT
dc.subjectVULNERABILITY
dc.subjectWAGES
dc.subjectWAR LITERATURE
dc.subjectWARS
dc.subjectWORLD DEVELOPMENT
dc.titleNatural Resources, Weak States and Civil War : Can Rents Stabilize Coup Prone Regimes?

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