What Does Political Economy Tell Us About Economic Development and Vice Versa?

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dc.creatorKeefer, Philip
dc.date2013-08-05T13:04:59Z
dc.date2013-08-05T13:04:59Z
dc.date2004-03
dc.date.accessioned2026-07-01T01:23:29Z
dc.descriptionThe author reviews how three pillars of political economy-collective action, institutions, and political market imperfections-help us answer the question: Why do some countries develop and others do not? Each makes tremendous advances in our understanding of who wins and who loses in government decision making, generally, but only a subset of this literature helps us answer the question. The study of political market imperfections strongly suggests that the lack of credibility of pre-electoral political promises and incomplete voter information are especially robust in explaining development outcomes. From the institutional literature, the most powerful explanation of contrasting development outcomes links political checks and balances to the credibility of government commitments.
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dc.formattext/plain
dc.identifierhttp://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2004/03/3211802/political-economy-tell-economic-development-vice-versa
dc.identifierhttps://hdl.handle.net/10986/14786
dc.identifierhttps://doi.org/10.1596/1813-9450-3250
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/123456789/417663
dc.languageEnglish
dc.languageen_US
dc.publisherWorld Bank, Washington, D.C.
dc.relationPolicy Research Working Paper;No.3250
dc.rightsCC BY 3.0 IGO
dc.rightshttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo/
dc.rightsWorld Bank
dc.subjectPOLITICAL ECONOMY
dc.subjectECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
dc.subjectCOLLECTIVE ACTION
dc.subjectINSTITUTIONS
dc.subjectPOLITICAL ASPECTS OF ECONOMIC POLICY
dc.subjectVOTERS
dc.subjectPOLITICAL INSTITUTIONS AGRICULTURE
dc.subjectANTI-CORRUPTION
dc.subjectAUTHORITY
dc.subjectBARRIERS TO ENTRY
dc.subjectCABINET
dc.subjectCABINET GOVERNMENTS
dc.subjectCITIZEN
dc.subjectCITIZENS
dc.subjectCOLLECTIVE ACTION
dc.subjectCOLONIES
dc.subjectCONSTITUENCIES
dc.subjectCONSTITUENCY
dc.subjectCONSTITUENTS
dc.subjectCONSTITUTION
dc.subjectCORRUPTION
dc.subjectCORRUPTION DATA
dc.subjectCOUNTRY DATA
dc.subjectDECISION MAKERS
dc.subjectDECISION MAKING
dc.subjectDEMOCRACIES
dc.subjectDEMOCRACY
dc.subjectDEREGULATION
dc.subjectDICTATORSHIP
dc.subjectDISTRICTS
dc.subjectECONOMIC ACTIVITY
dc.subjectECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
dc.subjectECONOMIC EFFECTS
dc.subjectECONOMIC POLICIES
dc.subjectECONOMIC POWER
dc.subjectECONOMIC RENTS
dc.subjectELECTION
dc.subjectELECTORAL RULES
dc.subjectELECTORAL SYSTEMS
dc.subjectELECTORATE
dc.subjectEMPIRICAL EVIDENCE
dc.subjectEXECUTIVE BRANCH
dc.subjectFINANCIAL CRISES
dc.subjectFORMAL INSTITUTIONS
dc.subjectFRANCHISE
dc.subjectGOVERNMENT ACTION
dc.subjectGOVERNMENT CREDIBILITY
dc.subjectGOVERNMENT DECISION
dc.subjectGOVERNMENT DECISION MAKING
dc.subjectGOVERNMENT PERFORMANCE
dc.subjectGOVERNMENT POLICY
dc.subjectGOVERNMENT SPENDING
dc.subjectGROWTH
dc.subjectINCOME
dc.subjectINEFFICIENCY
dc.subjectINEQUALITY
dc.subjectINSOLVENT
dc.subjectINSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS
dc.subjectLAWS
dc.subjectLEGAL OBSTACLES
dc.subjectLEGISLATION
dc.subjectLEGISLATIVE COMMITTEES
dc.subjectLEGISLATIVE ELECTIONS
dc.subjectLEGISLATOR
dc.subjectLEGISLATORS
dc.subjectLEGISLATURE
dc.subjectLEGISLATURES
dc.subjectLESS DEVELOPED COUNTRIES
dc.subjectLOWER HOUSE
dc.subjectMINISTERS
dc.subjectMONETARY POLICY
dc.subjectMOTIVATIONS
dc.subjectNATIONAL BUDGET
dc.subjectNATIONAL INTEREST
dc.subjectNATIONAL POLICY
dc.subjectNATIONS
dc.subjectNATURAL RESOURCES
dc.subjectPARLIAMENT
dc.subjectPARLIAMENTARY SYSTEM
dc.subjectPARLIAMENTARY SYSTEMS
dc.subjectPARTY DISCIPLINE
dc.subjectPER CAPITA INCOME
dc.subjectPER CAPITA INCOMES
dc.subjectPOLICY MAKERS
dc.subjectPOLICY MAKING
dc.subjectPOLICY OUTCOMES
dc.subjectPOLITICAL ECONOMY
dc.subjectPOLITICAL ECONOMY OF REFORM
dc.subjectPOLITICAL INSTABILITY
dc.subjectPOLITICAL INSTITUTIONS
dc.subjectPOLITICAL LEADERS
dc.subjectPOLITICAL PARTIES
dc.subjectPOLITICAL POWER
dc.subjectPOLITICAL RISK
dc.subjectPOLITICAL SYSTEM
dc.subjectPOLITICIANS
dc.subjectPRESIDENTS
dc.subjectPRICE CONTROLS
dc.subjectPRIME MINISTER
dc.subjectPRIVATE GOODS
dc.subjectPRODUCER INCENTIVES
dc.subjectPUBLIC GOOD
dc.subjectPUBLIC GOODS
dc.subjectPUBLIC INTEREST
dc.subjectPUBLIC INVESTMENT
dc.subjectPUBLIC POLICY
dc.subjectPUBLIC SPENDING
dc.subjectPURCHASING POWER
dc.subjectPURCHASING POWER PARITY
dc.subjectREPRESENTATIVES
dc.subjectRULE OF LAW
dc.subjectSAVINGS
dc.subjectSENATE
dc.subjectSEPARATION OF POWERS
dc.subjectSKILLED WORKERS
dc.subjectSTANDING ORDERS
dc.subjectSTATE GOVERNORS
dc.subjectTAX RATE
dc.subjectTAXATION
dc.subjectTECHNOLOGICAL INNOVATION
dc.subjectTRADEOFFS
dc.subjectVETO
dc.subjectVETO POWER
dc.subjectVOTER PREFERENCES
dc.subjectVOTERS
dc.subjectVOTING
dc.subjectWEALTH
dc.titleWhat Does Political Economy Tell Us About Economic Development and Vice Versa?

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