What Does Political Economy Tell Us About Economic Development and Vice Versa?
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World Bank, Washington, D.C.
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The author reviews how three pillars of
political economy-collective action, institutions, and
political market imperfections-help us answer the question:
Why do some countries develop and others do not? Each makes
tremendous advances in our understanding of who wins and who
loses in government decision making, generally, but only a
subset of this literature helps us answer the question. The
study of political market imperfections strongly suggests
that the lack of credibility of pre-electoral political
promises and incomplete voter information are especially
robust in explaining development outcomes. From the
institutional literature, the most powerful explanation of
contrasting development outcomes links political checks and
balances to the credibility of government commitments.
Palabras clave
POLITICAL ECONOMY, ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, COLLECTIVE ACTION, INSTITUTIONS, POLITICAL ASPECTS OF ECONOMIC POLICY, VOTERS, POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS AGRICULTURE, ANTI-CORRUPTION, AUTHORITY, BARRIERS TO ENTRY, CABINET, CABINET GOVERNMENTS, CITIZEN, CITIZENS, COLLECTIVE ACTION, COLONIES, CONSTITUENCIES, CONSTITUENCY, CONSTITUENTS, CONSTITUTION, CORRUPTION, CORRUPTION DATA, COUNTRY DATA, DECISION MAKERS, DECISION MAKING, DEMOCRACIES, DEMOCRACY, DEREGULATION, DICTATORSHIP, DISTRICTS, ECONOMIC ACTIVITY, ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, ECONOMIC EFFECTS, ECONOMIC POLICIES, ECONOMIC POWER, ECONOMIC RENTS, ELECTION, ELECTORAL RULES, ELECTORAL SYSTEMS, ELECTORATE, EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE, EXECUTIVE BRANCH, FINANCIAL CRISES, FORMAL INSTITUTIONS, FRANCHISE, GOVERNMENT ACTION, GOVERNMENT CREDIBILITY, GOVERNMENT DECISION, GOVERNMENT DECISION MAKING, GOVERNMENT PERFORMANCE, GOVERNMENT POLICY, GOVERNMENT SPENDING, GROWTH, INCOME, INEFFICIENCY, INEQUALITY, INSOLVENT, INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS, LAWS, LEGAL OBSTACLES, LEGISLATION, LEGISLATIVE COMMITTEES, LEGISLATIVE ELECTIONS, LEGISLATOR, LEGISLATORS, LEGISLATURE, LEGISLATURES, LESS DEVELOPED COUNTRIES, LOWER HOUSE, MINISTERS, MONETARY POLICY, MOTIVATIONS, NATIONAL BUDGET, NATIONAL INTEREST, NATIONAL POLICY, NATIONS, NATURAL RESOURCES, PARLIAMENT, PARLIAMENTARY SYSTEM, PARLIAMENTARY SYSTEMS, PARTY DISCIPLINE, PER CAPITA INCOME, PER CAPITA INCOMES, POLICY MAKERS, POLICY MAKING, POLICY OUTCOMES, POLITICAL ECONOMY, POLITICAL ECONOMY OF REFORM, POLITICAL INSTABILITY, POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS, POLITICAL LEADERS, POLITICAL PARTIES, POLITICAL POWER, POLITICAL RISK, POLITICAL SYSTEM, POLITICIANS, PRESIDENTS, PRICE CONTROLS, PRIME MINISTER, PRIVATE GOODS, PRODUCER INCENTIVES, PUBLIC GOOD, PUBLIC GOODS, PUBLIC INTEREST, PUBLIC INVESTMENT, PUBLIC POLICY, PUBLIC SPENDING, PURCHASING POWER, PURCHASING POWER PARITY, REPRESENTATIVES, RULE OF LAW, SAVINGS, SENATE, SEPARATION OF POWERS, SKILLED WORKERS, STANDING ORDERS, STATE GOVERNORS, TAX RATE, TAXATION, TECHNOLOGICAL INNOVATION, TRADEOFFS, VETO, VETO POWER, VOTER PREFERENCES, VOTERS, VOTING, WEALTH