Constitutional Rules and Agricultural Policy Outcomes

Vista sencilla de ítem
dc.creatorOlper, Alessandro
dc.creatorRaimondi, Valentina
dc.date2017-09-07T16:32:30Z
dc.date2017-09-07T16:32:30Z
dc.date2009-05
dc.date.accessioned2026-07-01T00:35:08Z
dc.descriptionThis paper deals with the effect of constitutional rules on agricultural policy outcomes in a panel of observations for more than 70 developing and developed countries in the 1955-2005 period. Testable hypotheses are drawn from recent developments in the comparative politics literature that see political institutions as key elements in shaping public policies. Using differences-in-differences regressions we find a positive effect of a transition into democracy on agricultural protection. However, this average effect masks substantial heterogeneities across different forms of democracy. Indeed, what matters are transitions to proportional democracies, as well as to permanent democracies. Moreover, while the author does not detect significant differences across alternative forms of government (presidential versus parliamentary systems), there is some evidence that the effect of proportional election is exacerbated under parliamentary regimes, and diminished under presidential ones.
dc.formatapplication/pdf
dc.formattext/plain
dc.identifierhttp://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/148201468168839812/Constitutional-rules-and-agricultural-policy-outcomes
dc.identifierhttps://hdl.handle.net/10986/28158
dc.identifierhttps://doi.org/10.1596/28158
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/123456789/406691
dc.languageEnglish
dc.languageen_US
dc.publisherWorld Bank, Washington, DC
dc.relationAgricultural Distortions Working Paper;83
dc.rightsCC BY 3.0 IGO
dc.rightshttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo
dc.rightsWorld Bank
dc.subjectACCOUNTABILITY
dc.subjectAUTOCRACY
dc.subjectBARGAINING
dc.subjectCANDIDATES
dc.subjectCETERIS PARIBUS
dc.subjectCIVIL LIBERTIES
dc.subjectCOALITION GOVERNMENTS
dc.subjectCOMPARATIVE POLITICAL ECONOMY
dc.subjectCOMPARATIVE POLITICS
dc.subjectCONFIDENCE
dc.subjectCONSTITUENCIES
dc.subjectCONSTITUENCY
dc.subjectCONSTITUENTS
dc.subjectDEMOCRACIES
dc.subjectDEMOCRACY
dc.subjectDEMOCRATIC REGIMES
dc.subjectECONOMIC GROWTH
dc.subjectECONOMIC LIBERALIZATION
dc.subjectECONOMIC POLICIES
dc.subjectECONOMIC THEORY
dc.subjectECONOMICS
dc.subjectELECTION
dc.subjectELECTIONS
dc.subjectELECTORAL SYSTEMS
dc.subjectEMPLOYMENT
dc.subjectEUROPEAN UNION
dc.subjectFISCAL POLICY
dc.subjectFRANCHISE
dc.subjectFREE TRADE
dc.subjectFREEDOM
dc.subjectGDP
dc.subjectIDEOLOGY
dc.subjectINCOME
dc.subjectINTEREST GROUP
dc.subjectINTEREST GROUPS
dc.subjectINTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION
dc.subjectINVESTIGATION
dc.subjectLABOR MARKET
dc.subjectLABOR MARKET POLICIES
dc.subjectLAWS
dc.subjectLEADERSHIP
dc.subjectLEFT-WING
dc.subjectLEGISLATION
dc.subjectLEGISLATIVE DECISION
dc.subjectLEGISLATIVE PROCESS
dc.subjectLEGISLATOR
dc.subjectLEGISLATORS
dc.subjectLOBBYING
dc.subjectLOWER HOUSE
dc.subjectPARLIAMENT
dc.subjectPARLIAMENTARY DEMOCRACY
dc.subjectPARLIAMENTARY SYSTEM
dc.subjectPARLIAMENTARY SYSTEMS
dc.subjectPARTY DISCIPLINE
dc.subjectPOLITICAL ACCOUNTABILITY
dc.subjectPOLITICAL BUSINESS CYCLE
dc.subjectPOLITICAL ECONOMICS
dc.subjectPOLITICAL ECONOMY
dc.subjectPOLITICAL EFFECTS
dc.subjectPOLITICAL INSTITUTIONS
dc.subjectPOLITICAL PROCESS
dc.subjectPOLITICAL REFORMS
dc.subjectPOLITICAL RIGHTS
dc.subjectPOLITICAL SCIENCE
dc.subjectPOLITICAL SYSTEMS
dc.subjectPOLITICAL VARIABLES
dc.subjectPOLITICIAN
dc.subjectPOLITICIANS
dc.subjectPROPERTY RIGHTS
dc.subjectPROTECTIONISM
dc.subjectPUBLIC GOODS
dc.subjectPUBLIC POLICY
dc.subjectRENTS
dc.subjectSEPARATION OF POWERS
dc.subjectTAX
dc.subjectTAXATION
dc.subjectTRADE LIBERALIZATION
dc.subjectTRADE POLICY
dc.subjectVETO
dc.subjectVOTING
dc.subjectVOTING RIGHTS
dc.titleConstitutional Rules and Agricultural Policy Outcomes
dc.typeWorking Paper
dc.typeDocument de travail
dc.typeDocumento de trabajo

Archivos

Colecciones

AgroKnow