Constitutional Rules and Agricultural Policy Outcomes
No hay miniatura disponible
Fecha
Autores
Título de la revista
ISSN de la revista
Título del volumen
Editor
World Bank, Washington, DC
Resumen
Descripción
This paper deals with the effect of
constitutional rules on agricultural policy outcomes in a
panel of observations for more than 70 developing and
developed countries in the 1955-2005 period. Testable
hypotheses are drawn from recent developments in the
comparative politics literature that see political
institutions as key elements in shaping public policies.
Using differences-in-differences regressions we find a
positive effect of a transition into democracy on
agricultural protection. However, this average effect masks
substantial heterogeneities across different forms of
democracy. Indeed, what matters are transitions to
proportional democracies, as well as to permanent
democracies. Moreover, while the author does not detect
significant differences across alternative forms of
government (presidential versus parliamentary systems),
there is some evidence that the effect of proportional
election is exacerbated under parliamentary regimes, and
diminished under presidential ones.
Palabras clave
ACCOUNTABILITY, AUTOCRACY, BARGAINING, CANDIDATES, CETERIS PARIBUS, CIVIL LIBERTIES, COALITION GOVERNMENTS, COMPARATIVE POLITICAL ECONOMY, COMPARATIVE POLITICS, CONFIDENCE, CONSTITUENCIES, CONSTITUENCY, CONSTITUENTS, DEMOCRACIES, DEMOCRACY, DEMOCRATIC REGIMES, ECONOMIC GROWTH, ECONOMIC LIBERALIZATION, ECONOMIC POLICIES, ECONOMIC THEORY, ECONOMICS, ELECTION, ELECTIONS, ELECTORAL SYSTEMS, EMPLOYMENT, EUROPEAN UNION, FISCAL POLICY, FRANCHISE, FREE TRADE, FREEDOM, GDP, IDEOLOGY, INCOME, INTEREST GROUP, INTEREST GROUPS, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION, INVESTIGATION, LABOR MARKET, LABOR MARKET POLICIES, LAWS, LEADERSHIP, LEFT-WING, LEGISLATION, LEGISLATIVE DECISION, LEGISLATIVE PROCESS, LEGISLATOR, LEGISLATORS, LOBBYING, LOWER HOUSE, PARLIAMENT, PARLIAMENTARY DEMOCRACY, PARLIAMENTARY SYSTEM, PARLIAMENTARY SYSTEMS, PARTY DISCIPLINE, POLITICAL ACCOUNTABILITY, POLITICAL BUSINESS CYCLE, POLITICAL ECONOMICS, POLITICAL ECONOMY, POLITICAL EFFECTS, POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS, POLITICAL PROCESS, POLITICAL REFORMS, POLITICAL RIGHTS, POLITICAL SCIENCE, POLITICAL SYSTEMS, POLITICAL VARIABLES, POLITICIAN, POLITICIANS, PROPERTY RIGHTS, PROTECTIONISM, PUBLIC GOODS, PUBLIC POLICY, RENTS, SEPARATION OF POWERS, TAX, TAXATION, TRADE LIBERALIZATION, TRADE POLICY, VETO, VOTING, VOTING RIGHTS