The Logic of the CAP

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dc.creatorHenning, Christian H.C.A.
dc.creatorStruve, Carsten
dc.creatorBrockmeier, Martina
dc.date2017-09-07T18:15:16Z
dc.date2017-09-07T18:15:16Z
dc.date2008-11-02
dc.date.accessioned2026-07-01T01:03:04Z
dc.descriptionThis paper derives an applied general political economy model incorporating a model of political decision making into a computable general economic equilibrium model. Political decision making among a set of legislators is modeled via a mean voter decision rule derived from a modified non cooperative legislative bargaining game of a Baron Ferejohn type. The model allows a simultaneous analysis of political and economic factors determining policy outcome and is applied to simulate future Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) under various political and economic scenarios.
dc.formatapplication/pdf
dc.formattext/plain
dc.identifierhttp://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/355811468339615195/The-logic-of-the-CAP-politics-or-economics
dc.identifierhttps://hdl.handle.net/10986/28181
dc.identifierhttps://doi.org/10.1596/28181
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/123456789/414707
dc.languageEnglish
dc.languageen_US
dc.publisherWorld Bank, Washington, DC
dc.relationAgricultural Distortions Working Paper;77
dc.rightsCC BY 3.0 IGO
dc.rightshttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo
dc.rightsWorld Bank
dc.subjectAGRICULTURAL POLICIES
dc.subjectAGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION
dc.subjectBARGAINING
dc.subjectBARGAINING POWER
dc.subjectCETERIS PARIBUS
dc.subjectCONSUMERS
dc.subjectCULTURAL CHANGE
dc.subjectDECISION MAKING
dc.subjectDECISION-MAKING
dc.subjectDEMOCRACY
dc.subjectDEMOGRAPHIC FACTORS
dc.subjectDEVELOPING COUNTRIES
dc.subjectDEVELOPMENT POLICY
dc.subjectECONOMIC ANALYSIS
dc.subjectECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
dc.subjectECONOMIC CONDITIONS
dc.subjectECONOMIC EQUILIBRIUM
dc.subjectECONOMIC FACTORS
dc.subjectECONOMIC MODELS
dc.subjectECONOMIC PERFORMANCE
dc.subjectECONOMIC SYSTEM
dc.subjectECONOMIC SYSTEMS
dc.subjectECONOMIC THEORY
dc.subjectECONOMICS
dc.subjectENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION
dc.subjectEXPECTED UTILITY
dc.subjectEXPERIMENTAL ECONOMICS
dc.subjectFORECASTS
dc.subjectFUTURE RESEARCH
dc.subjectGENERAL EQUILIBRIUM
dc.subjectGENERAL EQUILIBRIUM MODELS
dc.subjectGLOBAL POLICY
dc.subjectHUMAN BEINGS
dc.subjectIDEOLOGY
dc.subjectIMPERFECT INFORMATION
dc.subjectIMPORT QUOTAS
dc.subjectINCENTIVE PROBLEMS
dc.subjectINCOME
dc.subjectINSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS
dc.subjectINTEREST GROUP
dc.subjectINTERNATIONAL FOOD POLICY RESEARCH INSTITUTE
dc.subjectINTERNATIONAL TRADE
dc.subjectLEGISLATORS
dc.subjectLOGROLLING
dc.subjectMACROECONOMIC POLICIES
dc.subjectMOTIVATION
dc.subjectNASH EQUILIBRIUM
dc.subjectNATIONAL COUNCIL
dc.subjectNEW POLITICAL ECONOMY
dc.subjectPARTY PLATFORM
dc.subjectPOLICY CONCERN
dc.subjectPOLICY DECISIONS
dc.subjectPOLICY DEVELOPMENTS
dc.subjectPOLICY IMPLICATIONS
dc.subjectPOLICY RESEARCH
dc.subjectPOLICY RESPONSE
dc.subjectPOLITICAL DECISION
dc.subjectPOLITICAL ECONOMICS
dc.subjectPOLITICAL ECONOMY
dc.subjectPOLITICAL ECONOMY STUDIES
dc.subjectPOLITICAL INSTITUTIONS
dc.subjectPOLITICAL PARTICIPATION
dc.subjectPOLITICAL POWER
dc.subjectPOLITICAL SCIENCE
dc.subjectPOLITICAL SUPPORT
dc.subjectPOLITICAL SYSTEMS
dc.subjectPOTENTIAL CONTRIBUTION
dc.subjectPREFERENCE FUNCTIONS
dc.subjectPRICE POLICIES
dc.subjectPRODUCTION FUNCTIONS
dc.subjectPRODUCTIVITY
dc.subjectPROGRAMS
dc.subjectPROGRESS
dc.subjectPROTECTIONISM
dc.subjectRESOURCE ALLOCATION
dc.subjectRISK AVERSE
dc.subjectRURAL DEVELOPMENT
dc.subjectSOCIAL POLICIES
dc.subjectTRADE POLICIES
dc.subjectTRADE-OFF
dc.subjectTREATY
dc.subjectURBAN POPULATION
dc.subjectUTILITY FUNCTION
dc.subjectUTILITY FUNCTIONS
dc.subjectUTILITY MAXIMIZATION
dc.subjectVOTERS
dc.subjectWAGE RATES
dc.subjectWTO
dc.titleThe Logic of the CAP
dc.titlePolitics or Economics?
dc.typeWorking Paper
dc.typeDocument de travail
dc.typeDocumento de trabajo

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