The Logic of the CAP

Henning, Christian H.C.A.; Struve, Carsten; Brockmeier, Martina

The Logic of the CAP

Autores

Henning, Christian H.C.A.

Struve, Carsten

Brockmeier, Martina

Editor

World Bank, Washington, DC

Descripción

This paper derives an applied general political economy model incorporating a model of political decision making into a computable general economic equilibrium model. Political decision making among a set of legislators is modeled via a mean voter decision rule derived from a modified non cooperative legislative bargaining game of a Baron Ferejohn type. The model allows a simultaneous analysis of political and economic factors determining policy outcome and is applied to simulate future Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) under various political and economic scenarios.

Palabras clave

AGRICULTURAL POLICIES, AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION, BARGAINING, BARGAINING POWER, CETERIS PARIBUS, CONSUMERS, CULTURAL CHANGE, DECISION MAKING, DECISION-MAKING, DEMOCRACY, DEMOGRAPHIC FACTORS, DEVELOPING COUNTRIES, DEVELOPMENT POLICY, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR, ECONOMIC CONDITIONS, ECONOMIC EQUILIBRIUM, ECONOMIC FACTORS, ECONOMIC MODELS, ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE, ECONOMIC SYSTEM, ECONOMIC SYSTEMS, ECONOMIC THEORY, ECONOMICS, ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION, EXPECTED UTILITY, EXPERIMENTAL ECONOMICS, FORECASTS, FUTURE RESEARCH, GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM, GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM MODELS, GLOBAL POLICY, HUMAN BEINGS, IDEOLOGY, IMPERFECT INFORMATION, IMPORT QUOTAS, INCENTIVE PROBLEMS, INCOME, INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS, INTEREST GROUP, INTERNATIONAL FOOD POLICY RESEARCH INSTITUTE, INTERNATIONAL TRADE, LEGISLATORS, LOGROLLING, MACROECONOMIC POLICIES, MOTIVATION, NASH EQUILIBRIUM, NATIONAL COUNCIL, NEW POLITICAL ECONOMY, PARTY PLATFORM, POLICY CONCERN, POLICY DECISIONS, POLICY DEVELOPMENTS, POLICY IMPLICATIONS, POLICY RESEARCH, POLICY RESPONSE, POLITICAL DECISION, POLITICAL ECONOMICS, POLITICAL ECONOMY, POLITICAL ECONOMY STUDIES, POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS, POLITICAL PARTICIPATION, POLITICAL POWER, POLITICAL SCIENCE, POLITICAL SUPPORT, POLITICAL SYSTEMS, POTENTIAL CONTRIBUTION, PREFERENCE FUNCTIONS, PRICE POLICIES, PRODUCTION FUNCTIONS, PRODUCTIVITY, PROGRAMS, PROGRESS, PROTECTIONISM, RESOURCE ALLOCATION, RISK AVERSE, RURAL DEVELOPMENT, SOCIAL POLICIES, TRADE POLICIES, TRADE-OFF, TREATY, URBAN POPULATION, UTILITY FUNCTION, UTILITY FUNCTIONS, UTILITY MAXIMIZATION, VOTERS, WAGE RATES, WTO