When quality (doesn't) pay: Evidence from two experiments in Uganda

dc.creatorVan Campenhout, Bjorn
dc.creatorAriong, Richard M.
dc.creatorKariuki, Sara Wairimu
dc.creatorChamberlin, Jordan
dc.date2026-06-11
dc.date2026-06-12T13:40:07Z
dc.date.accessioned2026-06-27T15:01:08Z
dc.descriptionQuality in agri-food supply chains is often unobservable at first sale and early aggregation limits traceability, weakening incentives for quality provision. We study whether making milk quality visible and traceable creates a market for quality in Uganda’s dairy sector. Increasing observability reduces adulteration and improves quality, but no premium emerges. In a follow-up experiment, we introduce trader quality premiums. This increases quality when binding, yet informed intermediaries capture the gains and farm-gate prices do not rise. Observability is necessary but insufficient: without downstream demand for quality and pass-through by intermediaries, incentives for quality upgrading remain weak.
dc.formatapplication/pdf
dc.identifierhttps://hdl.handle.net/10568/183322
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/123456789/92203
dc.languageen
dc.publisherInternational Food Policy Research Institute
dc.relationhttps://doi.org/10.1111/agec.12638
dc.relationhttps://doi.org/10.1111/agec.12731
dc.relationhttps://hdl.handle.net/10568/149239
dc.relationhttps://hdl.handle.net/10568/169291
dc.rightsOpen Access
dc.sourceVan Campenhout, Bjorn; Ariong, Richard M.; Kariuki, Sarah Wairimu; and Chamberlin, Jordan. 2026. When quality (doesn't) pay: Evidence from two experiments in Uganda. IFPRI Discussion Paper 2420. Washington, DC: International Food Policy Research Institute. https://hdl.handle.net/10568/183322
dc.subjectdairying
dc.subjectvalue chains
dc.subjectenforcement
dc.subjectquality management
dc.subjectquality assurance
dc.subjectquality control
dc.titleWhen quality (doesn't) pay: Evidence from two experiments in Uganda
dc.typeWorking Paper

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