When quality (doesn't) pay: Evidence from two experiments in Uganda
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International Food Policy Research Institute
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Quality in agri-food supply chains is often unobservable at first sale and early aggregation limits traceability, weakening incentives for quality provision. We study whether making milk quality visible and traceable creates a market for quality in Uganda’s dairy sector. Increasing observability reduces adulteration and improves quality, but no premium emerges. In a follow-up experiment, we introduce trader quality premiums. This increases quality when binding, yet informed intermediaries capture the gains and farm-gate prices do not rise. Observability is necessary but insufficient: without downstream demand for quality and pass-through by intermediaries, incentives for quality upgrading remain weak.
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dairying, value chains, enforcement, quality management, quality assurance, quality control