Localization and Corruption : Panacea or Pandora’s Box?
| dc.creator | Gurgur, Tugrul | |
| dc.creator | Shah, Anwar | |
| dc.date | 2012-06-22T22:10:38Z | |
| dc.date | 2012-06-22T22:10:38Z | |
| dc.date | 2005-01 | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2026-07-01T01:29:37Z | |
| dc.description | An extensive literature on the relationship between decentralization (or localization) and corruption has developed in recent years. While some authors argue that there is a positive relationship between decentralization and corruption, others claim that decentralization in fact leads to a reduction in the level of corruption. This important policy question has not yet been laid to rest, since previous empirical work simply uses eclectic regressions and lacks a conceptual framework to discover the root causes of corruption. This paper attempts to fill this void by presenting a framework in identifying the drivers of corruption both conceptually and empirically in order to isolate the role of centralized decision-making on corruption. The following results emerge: 1) For a sample of 30 countries (developing and industrial), corruption is caused by: a lack of service-orientation in the public sector, weak democratic institutions, economic isolation (closed economy), colonial past, internal bureaucratic controls and centralized decision making. 2) Decentralization is found to have a negative impact on corruption, with the effect being stronger in unitary than in federal countries. | |
| dc.format | application/pdf | |
| dc.format | text/plain | |
| dc.identifier | http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2005/01/5592592/localization-corruption-panacea-or-pandoras-box | |
| dc.identifier | https://hdl.handle.net/10986/8899 | |
| dc.identifier | https://doi.org/10.1596/1813-9450-3486 | |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/123456789/418587 | |
| dc.language | English | |
| dc.publisher | World Bank, Washington, DC | |
| dc.relation | Policy Research Working Paper; No. 3486 | |
| dc.rights | CC BY 3.0 IGO | |
| dc.rights | http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo/ | |
| dc.rights | World Bank | |
| dc.subject | ACCOUNTABILITY | |
| dc.subject | ADMINISTRATIVE DECENTRALIZATION | |
| dc.subject | ADMINISTRATIVE DISCRETION | |
| dc.subject | ANECDOTAL EVIDENCE | |
| dc.subject | ANTICORRUPTION | |
| dc.subject | ANTICORRUPTION EFFORTS | |
| dc.subject | BANKS | |
| dc.subject | BRIBERY | |
| dc.subject | BRIBES | |
| dc.subject | BUREAUCRACY | |
| dc.subject | CENTRAL GOVERNMENT | |
| dc.subject | CITIZEN PARTICIPATION | |
| dc.subject | CITIZENS | |
| dc.subject | CIVIL LIBERTIES | |
| dc.subject | CIVIL RIGHTS | |
| dc.subject | CIVIL SERVANTS | |
| dc.subject | CIVIL SERVICE | |
| dc.subject | CIVIL SOCIETY | |
| dc.subject | COLLUSION | |
| dc.subject | COMMUNITIES | |
| dc.subject | COMMUNITY GROUPS | |
| dc.subject | CORRUPT OFFICIALS | |
| dc.subject | CORRUPT PRACTICES | |
| dc.subject | CORRUPTION | |
| dc.subject | CORRUPTION IN GOVERNMENT | |
| dc.subject | CORRUPTION PERCEPTIONS | |
| dc.subject | CORRUPTION PERCEPTIONS INDEX | |
| dc.subject | CPI | |
| dc.subject | CRIME | |
| dc.subject | CRIMINAL LAW | |
| dc.subject | DECENTRALIZATION INITIATIVES | |
| dc.subject | DEMOCRACY | |
| dc.subject | DEMOCRATIC RIGHTS | |
| dc.subject | ELECTED OFFICIALS | |
| dc.subject | EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE | |
| dc.subject | EMPIRICAL RESEARCH | |
| dc.subject | EMPLOYMENT | |
| dc.subject | ETHNIC GROUPS | |
| dc.subject | ETHNIC HETEROGENEITY | |
| dc.subject | EXPENDITURES | |
| dc.subject | EXTORTION | |
| dc.subject | FEDERAL STATES | |
| dc.subject | FISCAL DECENTRALIZATION | |
| dc.subject | GOVERNMENT CONSUMPTION | |
| dc.subject | GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURES | |
| dc.subject | GOVERNMENT INSTITUTIONS | |
| dc.subject | GOVERNMENT INTERVENTION | |
| dc.subject | GOVERNMENT MANDATES | |
| dc.subject | GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS | |
| dc.subject | GOVERNMENT PERFORMANCE | |
| dc.subject | GOVERNMENT PROPERTY | |
| dc.subject | GOVERNMENT SIZE | |
| dc.subject | GOVERNMENT SPENDING | |
| dc.subject | GOVERNMENT STRUCTURES | |
| dc.subject | HIGH CORRUPTION | |
| dc.subject | INTERJURISDICTIONAL COMPETITION | |
| dc.subject | JURISDICTIONS | |
| dc.subject | JUSTICE | |
| dc.subject | LAWS | |
| dc.subject | LEVELS OF GOVERNMENT | |
| dc.subject | LOCAL AUTHORITIES | |
| dc.subject | LOCAL ELECTIONS | |
| dc.subject | LOCAL OFFICIALS | |
| dc.subject | LOCAL POLITICIANS | |
| dc.subject | MEDIA | |
| dc.subject | MOTIVATIONS | |
| dc.subject | NATIONS | |
| dc.subject | NEPOTISM | |
| dc.subject | PARLIAMENTARY COMMITTEES | |
| dc.subject | PARLIAMENTARY OVERSIGHT | |
| dc.subject | PARTY DISCIPLINE | |
| dc.subject | PENALTIES | |
| dc.subject | PETTY CORRUPTION | |
| dc.subject | POLICY RESEARCH | |
| dc.subject | POLITICAL CONTROL | |
| dc.subject | POLITICAL DECENTRALIZATION | |
| dc.subject | POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS | |
| dc.subject | POLITICAL RIGHTS | |
| dc.subject | PRIVATE SECTOR | |
| dc.subject | PROCUREMENT | |
| dc.subject | PUBLIC INVESTMENT | |
| dc.subject | PUBLIC OFFICIALS | |
| dc.subject | PUBLIC SERVICE | |
| dc.subject | PUBLIC SERVICE DELIVERY | |
| dc.subject | PUBLIC TRUST | |
| dc.subject | PUNISHMENT | |
| dc.subject | RENT SEEKING | |
| dc.subject | RULE OF LAW | |
| dc.subject | RULES OF CONDUCT | |
| dc.subject | SERVICE DELIVERY | |
| dc.subject | SIZE OF GOVERNMENT | |
| dc.subject | SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT | |
| dc.subject | SOCIAL GROUPS | |
| dc.subject | SUBNATIONAL GOVERNMENT | |
| dc.subject | TAX SYSTEMS | |
| dc.subject | TRANSPARENCY | |
| dc.subject | TRANSPORTATION | |
| dc.subject | UPPER HOUSE | |
| dc.subject | VETO | |
| dc.subject | VETO POWER | |
| dc.title | Localization and Corruption : Panacea or Pandora’s Box? |
