Localization and Corruption : Panacea or Pandora’s Box?
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World Bank, Washington, DC
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An extensive literature on the relationship between decentralization (or localization) and corruption has developed in recent years. While some authors argue that there is a positive relationship between decentralization and corruption, others claim that decentralization in fact leads to a reduction in the level of corruption. This important policy question has not yet been laid to rest, since previous empirical work simply uses eclectic regressions and lacks a conceptual framework to discover the root causes of corruption. This paper attempts to fill this void by presenting a framework in identifying the drivers of corruption both conceptually and empirically in order to isolate the role of centralized decision-making on corruption. The following results emerge: 1) For a sample of 30 countries (developing and industrial), corruption is caused by: a lack of service-orientation in the public sector, weak democratic institutions, economic isolation (closed economy), colonial past, internal bureaucratic controls and centralized decision making. 2) Decentralization is found to have a negative impact on corruption, with the effect being stronger in unitary than in federal countries.
Palabras clave
ACCOUNTABILITY, ADMINISTRATIVE DECENTRALIZATION, ADMINISTRATIVE DISCRETION, ANECDOTAL EVIDENCE, ANTICORRUPTION, ANTICORRUPTION EFFORTS, BANKS, BRIBERY, BRIBES, BUREAUCRACY, CENTRAL GOVERNMENT, CITIZEN PARTICIPATION, CITIZENS, CIVIL LIBERTIES, CIVIL RIGHTS, CIVIL SERVANTS, CIVIL SERVICE, CIVIL SOCIETY, COLLUSION, COMMUNITIES, COMMUNITY GROUPS, CORRUPT OFFICIALS, CORRUPT PRACTICES, CORRUPTION, CORRUPTION IN GOVERNMENT, CORRUPTION PERCEPTIONS, CORRUPTION PERCEPTIONS INDEX, CPI, CRIME, CRIMINAL LAW, DECENTRALIZATION INITIATIVES, DEMOCRACY, DEMOCRATIC RIGHTS, ELECTED OFFICIALS, EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE, EMPIRICAL RESEARCH, EMPLOYMENT, ETHNIC GROUPS, ETHNIC HETEROGENEITY, EXPENDITURES, EXTORTION, FEDERAL STATES, FISCAL DECENTRALIZATION, GOVERNMENT CONSUMPTION, GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURES, GOVERNMENT INSTITUTIONS, GOVERNMENT INTERVENTION, GOVERNMENT MANDATES, GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS, GOVERNMENT PERFORMANCE, GOVERNMENT PROPERTY, GOVERNMENT SIZE, GOVERNMENT SPENDING, GOVERNMENT STRUCTURES, HIGH CORRUPTION, INTERJURISDICTIONAL COMPETITION, JURISDICTIONS, JUSTICE, LAWS, LEVELS OF GOVERNMENT, LOCAL AUTHORITIES, LOCAL ELECTIONS, LOCAL OFFICIALS, LOCAL POLITICIANS, MEDIA, MOTIVATIONS, NATIONS, NEPOTISM, PARLIAMENTARY COMMITTEES, PARLIAMENTARY OVERSIGHT, PARTY DISCIPLINE, PENALTIES, PETTY CORRUPTION, POLICY RESEARCH, POLITICAL CONTROL, POLITICAL DECENTRALIZATION, POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS, POLITICAL RIGHTS, PRIVATE SECTOR, PROCUREMENT, PUBLIC INVESTMENT, PUBLIC OFFICIALS, PUBLIC SERVICE, PUBLIC SERVICE DELIVERY, PUBLIC TRUST, PUNISHMENT, RENT SEEKING, RULE OF LAW, RULES OF CONDUCT, SERVICE DELIVERY, SIZE OF GOVERNMENT, SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT, SOCIAL GROUPS, SUBNATIONAL GOVERNMENT, TAX SYSTEMS, TRANSPARENCY, TRANSPORTATION, UPPER HOUSE, VETO, VETO POWER