On the Effects of Enforcement on Illegal Markets

Vista sencilla de ítem
dc.creatorMejía, Daniel
dc.creatorRestrepo, Pascual
dc.creatorRozo, Sandra V.
dc.date2015-09-23T19:53:21Z
dc.date2015-09-23T19:53:21Z
dc.date2015-09
dc.date.accessioned2026-07-01T00:51:18Z
dc.descriptionThis paper studies the effects of enforcement on illegal behavior in the context of a large aerial spraying program designed to curb coca cultivation in Colombia. In 2006, the Colombian government pledged not to spray a 10 km band around the frontier with Ecuador due to diplomatic frictions arising from the possibly negative collateral effects of this policy on the Ecuadorian side of the border. This variation is used to estimate the effect of spraying on coca cultivation by regression discontinuity around the 10 km threshold and by conditional differences in differences. The results suggest that spraying one additional hectare reduces coca cultivation by 0.022 to 0.03 hectares; these effects are too small to make aerial spraying a cost-effective policy for reducing cocaine production in Colombia.
dc.formatapplication/pdf
dc.formattext/plain
dc.identifierhttp://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2015/09/24990286/effects-enforcement-illegal-markets-evidence-quasi-experiment-colombia
dc.identifierhttps://hdl.handle.net/10986/22665
dc.identifierhttps://doi.org/10.1596/1813-9450-7409
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/123456789/411995
dc.languageEnglish
dc.languageen_US
dc.publisherWorld Bank, Washington, DC
dc.relationPolicy Research Working Paper;No. 7409
dc.rightsCC BY 3.0 IGO
dc.rightshttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo/
dc.rightsWorld Bank
dc.subjectCHEMICALS
dc.subjectPOLICIES
dc.subjectCROP
dc.subjectCOCA
dc.subjectMILITARY
dc.subjectPLANTATIONS
dc.subjectSPRAYING
dc.subjectTIME
dc.subjectMOLASSES
dc.subjectPOLICE
dc.subjectRESEARCH WORKING PAPERS
dc.subjectVALIDITY
dc.subjectCRIMES
dc.subjectINTERDICTION
dc.subjectTERRORIST
dc.subjectCULTIVATION
dc.subjectBANK
dc.subjectGOVERNMENT
dc.subjectILLEGAL ACTIVITIES
dc.subjectSTRATEGIES
dc.subjectFINANCIAL RESOURCES
dc.subjectINFORMATION
dc.subjectSERVICES
dc.subjectFUMIGATION
dc.subjectILLEGAL CROPS
dc.subjectCELL
dc.subjectPLANTING
dc.subjectEFFECTS
dc.subjectCRIME
dc.subjectSURVEYS
dc.subjectPOLICY
dc.subjectWEEDS
dc.subjectMEASURES
dc.subjectESTIMATORS
dc.subjectATTACKS
dc.subjectCELLS
dc.subjectJUSTICE
dc.subjectTERRORIST ATTACK
dc.subjectWEIGHT
dc.subjectTERRORIST ATTACKS
dc.subjectCRIMINALS
dc.subjectEVIDENCE
dc.subjectPLANTS
dc.subjectTHEORY
dc.subjectTHEFTS
dc.subjectTECHNIQUES
dc.subjectSCIENTISTS
dc.subjectESTIMATING
dc.subjectSECURITY
dc.subjectSPACE
dc.subjectPENALTIES
dc.subjectILLEGAL ACTIVITY
dc.subjectGRASSES
dc.subjectMETHODOLOGIES
dc.subjectTESTS
dc.subjectSEEDS
dc.subjectLABORATORIES
dc.subjectYIELDS
dc.subjectAERIAL SPRAYING
dc.subjectESTIMATES
dc.subjectDOCUMENTS
dc.subjectORGANIZATIONS
dc.subjectHERBICIDES
dc.subjectAGREEMENT
dc.subjectSTRATEGY
dc.subjectCONFIDENCE
dc.subjectRESEARCH
dc.subjectMETHODOLOGY
dc.subjectARMED FORCES
dc.subjectROBBERIES
dc.subjectFARMERS
dc.subjectGOVERNMENTS
dc.subjectCROPS
dc.subjectTESTING
dc.subjectATTACK
dc.subjectGRANTS
dc.subjectPOLICE OFFICERS
dc.titleOn the Effects of Enforcement on Illegal Markets
dc.titleEvidence from a Quasi-Experiment in Colombia
dc.typeWorking Paper
dc.typeDocument de travail
dc.typeDocumento de trabajo

Archivos

Colecciones

AgroKnow