On the Effects of Enforcement on Illegal Markets
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World Bank, Washington, DC
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This paper studies the effects of
enforcement on illegal behavior in the context of a large
aerial spraying program designed to curb coca cultivation in
Colombia. In 2006, the Colombian government pledged not to
spray a 10 km band around the frontier with Ecuador due to
diplomatic frictions arising from the possibly negative
collateral effects of this policy on the Ecuadorian side of
the border. This variation is used to estimate the effect of
spraying on coca cultivation by regression discontinuity
around the 10 km threshold and by conditional differences in
differences. The results suggest that spraying one
additional hectare reduces coca cultivation by 0.022 to 0.03
hectares; these effects are too small to make aerial
spraying a cost-effective policy for reducing cocaine
production in Colombia.
Palabras clave
CHEMICALS, POLICIES, CROP, COCA, MILITARY, PLANTATIONS, SPRAYING, TIME, MOLASSES, POLICE, RESEARCH WORKING PAPERS, VALIDITY, CRIMES, INTERDICTION, TERRORIST, CULTIVATION, BANK, GOVERNMENT, ILLEGAL ACTIVITIES, STRATEGIES, FINANCIAL RESOURCES, INFORMATION, SERVICES, FUMIGATION, ILLEGAL CROPS, CELL, PLANTING, EFFECTS, CRIME, SURVEYS, POLICY, WEEDS, MEASURES, ESTIMATORS, ATTACKS, CELLS, JUSTICE, TERRORIST ATTACK, WEIGHT, TERRORIST ATTACKS, CRIMINALS, EVIDENCE, PLANTS, THEORY, THEFTS, TECHNIQUES, SCIENTISTS, ESTIMATING, SECURITY, SPACE, PENALTIES, ILLEGAL ACTIVITY, GRASSES, METHODOLOGIES, TESTS, SEEDS, LABORATORIES, YIELDS, AERIAL SPRAYING, ESTIMATES, DOCUMENTS, ORGANIZATIONS, HERBICIDES, AGREEMENT, STRATEGY, CONFIDENCE, RESEARCH, METHODOLOGY, ARMED FORCES, ROBBERIES, FARMERS, GOVERNMENTS, CROPS, TESTING, ATTACK, GRANTS, POLICE OFFICERS