Democracy, Public Expenditures, and the Poor

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dc.creatorKeefer, Philip
dc.creatorKhemani, Stuti
dc.date2014-04-17T17:26:20Z
dc.date2014-04-17T17:26:20Z
dc.date2003-11
dc.date.accessioned2026-07-01T01:21:32Z
dc.descriptionCountries vary systematically with respect to the incentives of politicians to provide broad public goods, and to reduce poverty. Even in developing countries that are democracies, politicians often have incentives to divert resources to political rents, and to private transfers that benefit a few citizens at the expense of many. These distortions can be traced to imperfections in political markets, that are greater in some countries than in others. The authors review the theory, and evidence on the impact of incomplete information of voters, the lack of credibility of political promises, and social polarization on political incentives. They argue that the effects of these imperfections are large, but that their implications are insufficiently integrated into the design of policy reforms aimed at improving the provision of public goods, and reducing poverty.
dc.formatapplication/pdf
dc.formattext/plain
dc.identifierhttp://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2003/11/2815688/democracy-public-expenditures-poor
dc.identifierhttps://hdl.handle.net/10986/17902
dc.identifierhttps://doi.org/10.1596/1813-9450-3164
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/123456789/417366
dc.languageEnglish
dc.languageen_US
dc.publisherWorld Bank, Washington, DC
dc.relationPolicy Research Working Paper;No. 3164
dc.rightsCC BY 3.0 IGO
dc.rightshttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo/
dc.subjectACCOUNTABILITY
dc.subjectADMINISTRATIVE COSTS
dc.subjectADVERTISEMENTS
dc.subjectAGRICULTURAL SUBSIDIES
dc.subjectBENCHMARK
dc.subjectCLINICS
dc.subjectCOMMODITIES
dc.subjectDEBT
dc.subjectDEMOCRACIES
dc.subjectDEMOCRACY
dc.subjectDEVELOPED COUNTRIES
dc.subjectDISCOUNT RATES
dc.subjectDISTRIBUTION OF INCOME
dc.subjectECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
dc.subjectEMPIRICAL EVIDENCE
dc.subjectEMPLOYMENT
dc.subjectENVIRONMENTAL SIGNALS
dc.subjectEQUILIBRIUM
dc.subjectEXPECTED VALUE
dc.subjectEXTERNALITIES
dc.subjectFISCAL POLICIES
dc.subjectFOOD PRODUCTION
dc.subjectGOVERNMENT EXPENDITURES
dc.subjectHEALTH CARE
dc.subjectHEALTH SERVICES
dc.subjectHEALTH WORKERS
dc.subjectIMPERFECT INFORMATION
dc.subjectINCENTIVE EFFECTS
dc.subjectINCOME
dc.subjectINCOME INEQUALITY
dc.subjectINFORMATION ACCESS
dc.subjectINFORMATION ASYMMETRIES
dc.subjectINFORMATION PROBLEMS
dc.subjectINNOVATIONS
dc.subjectLITERACY
dc.subjectLOW INCOME
dc.subjectMARGINAL UTILITY
dc.subjectMARKET FAILURES
dc.subjectMEDIA
dc.subjectMEDIAN VOTERS
dc.subjectOIL
dc.subjectPOLICY RESEARCH
dc.subjectPOLITICAL CAMPAIGNS
dc.subjectPOLITICAL ECONOMY
dc.subjectPOLITICAL PARTIES
dc.subjectPOLITICAL SYSTEMS
dc.subjectPRESENT VALUE
dc.subjectPRODUCERS
dc.subjectPROGRAMS
dc.subjectPUBLIC EXPENDITURES
dc.subjectPUBLIC GOOD
dc.subjectPUBLIC GOODS
dc.subjectPUBLIC HEALTH
dc.subjectPUBLIC POLICIES
dc.subjectPUBLIC POLICY
dc.subjectPUBLIC SERVICES
dc.subjectRADIO
dc.subjectRECURRENT EXPENDITURES
dc.subjectRESOURCE ALLOCATION
dc.subjectSERVICE DELIVERY
dc.subjectSOCIAL SERVICES
dc.subjectSOCIAL WELFARE
dc.subjectTAX REVENUE
dc.subjectTAXATION
dc.subjectTEACHER ABSENTEEISM
dc.subjectTEACHER PERFORMANCE
dc.subjectTEACHERS
dc.subjectTELEVISION
dc.subjectTRADEOFFS
dc.subjectVOTERS
dc.subjectWEALTH
dc.subjectWELFARE GAINS DEMOCRACY
dc.subjectPOLITICAL FACTORS
dc.subjectPOVERTY REDUCTION
dc.subjectPUBLIC GOODS VALUATION
dc.subjectPOVERTY REDUCTION
dc.subjectPUBLIC SPENDING
dc.subjectDIVERGENT THINKING
dc.subjectPUBLIC EXPENDITURES
dc.subjectPRIVATE TRANSFERS
dc.subjectDISTORTION
dc.subjectELECTION ADMINISTRATION
dc.subjectINFORMATION DISSEMINATION
dc.subjectCREDIBILITY OF RULES
dc.subjectSOCIAL ROLE
dc.subjectPOLICY REFORM
dc.subjectWELFARE GAINS
dc.titleDemocracy, Public Expenditures, and the Poor

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