Democracy, Public Expenditures, and the Poor
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World Bank, Washington, DC
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Countries vary systematically with
respect to the incentives of politicians to provide broad
public goods, and to reduce poverty. Even in developing
countries that are democracies, politicians often have
incentives to divert resources to political rents, and to
private transfers that benefit a few citizens at the expense
of many. These distortions can be traced to imperfections in
political markets, that are greater in some countries than
in others. The authors review the theory, and evidence on
the impact of incomplete information of voters, the lack of
credibility of political promises, and social polarization
on political incentives. They argue that the effects of
these imperfections are large, but that their implications
are insufficiently integrated into the design of policy
reforms aimed at improving the provision of public goods,
and reducing poverty.
Palabras clave
ACCOUNTABILITY, ADMINISTRATIVE COSTS, ADVERTISEMENTS, AGRICULTURAL SUBSIDIES, BENCHMARK, CLINICS, COMMODITIES, DEBT, DEMOCRACIES, DEMOCRACY, DEVELOPED COUNTRIES, DISCOUNT RATES, DISTRIBUTION OF INCOME, ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE, EMPLOYMENT, ENVIRONMENTAL SIGNALS, EQUILIBRIUM, EXPECTED VALUE, EXTERNALITIES, FISCAL POLICIES, FOOD PRODUCTION, GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURES, HEALTH CARE, HEALTH SERVICES, HEALTH WORKERS, IMPERFECT INFORMATION, INCENTIVE EFFECTS, INCOME, INCOME INEQUALITY, INFORMATION ACCESS, INFORMATION ASYMMETRIES, INFORMATION PROBLEMS, INNOVATIONS, LITERACY, LOW INCOME, MARGINAL UTILITY, MARKET FAILURES, MEDIA, MEDIAN VOTERS, OIL, POLICY RESEARCH, POLITICAL CAMPAIGNS, POLITICAL ECONOMY, POLITICAL PARTIES, POLITICAL SYSTEMS, PRESENT VALUE, PRODUCERS, PROGRAMS, PUBLIC EXPENDITURES, PUBLIC GOOD, PUBLIC GOODS, PUBLIC HEALTH, PUBLIC POLICIES, PUBLIC POLICY, PUBLIC SERVICES, RADIO, RECURRENT EXPENDITURES, RESOURCE ALLOCATION, SERVICE DELIVERY, SOCIAL SERVICES, SOCIAL WELFARE, TAX REVENUE, TAXATION, TEACHER ABSENTEEISM, TEACHER PERFORMANCE, TEACHERS, TELEVISION, TRADEOFFS, VOTERS, WEALTH, WELFARE GAINS DEMOCRACY, POLITICAL FACTORS, POVERTY REDUCTION, PUBLIC GOODS VALUATION, POVERTY REDUCTION, PUBLIC SPENDING, DIVERGENT THINKING, PUBLIC EXPENDITURES, PRIVATE TRANSFERS, DISTORTION, ELECTION ADMINISTRATION, INFORMATION DISSEMINATION, CREDIBILITY OF RULES, SOCIAL ROLE, POLICY REFORM, WELFARE GAINS