Does It Pay to Be a Cadre? Estimating the Returns to Being a Local Official in Rural China

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dc.creatorZhang, Jian
dc.creatorGiles, John
dc.creatorRozelle, Scott
dc.date2012-06-29T21:01:00Z
dc.date2012-06-29T21:01:00Z
dc.date2012-06
dc.date.accessioned2026-07-01T00:55:34Z
dc.descriptionRecruiting and retaining leaders and public servants at the grass-roots level in developing countries creates a potential tension between providing sufficient returns to attract talent and limiting the scope for excessive rent-seeking behavior. In China, researchers have frequently argued that village cadres, who are the lowest level of administrators in rural areas, exploit personal political status for economic gain. Much existing research, however, compares the earnings of cadre and non-cadre households in rural China without controlling for unobserved dimensions of ability that are also correlated with success as entrepreneurs or in non-agricultural activities. The findings of this paper suggest a measurable return to cadre status, but the magnitudes are not large and provide only a modest incentive to participate in village-level government. The paper does not find evidence that households of village cadres earn significant rents from having a family member who is a cadre. Given the increasing returns to non-agricultural employment since China's economic reforms began, it is not surprising that the returns to working as a village cadre have also increased over time. Returns to cadre-status are derived both from direct compensation and subsidies for cadres and indirectly through returns earned in off-farm employment from businesses and economic activities managed by villages.
dc.formatapplication/pdf
dc.formattext/plain
dc.identifierhttp://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2012/06/16357383/pay-cadre-estimating-returns-being-local-official-rural-china
dc.identifierhttps://hdl.handle.net/10986/9340
dc.identifier10.1596/1813-9450-6082
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/123456789/413040
dc.languageEnglish
dc.publisherWorld Bank, Washington, DC
dc.relationPolicy Research Working Paper; No. 6081
dc.rightsCC BY 3.0 IGO
dc.rightshttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo/
dc.rightsWorld Bank
dc.subjectADMINISTRATIVE REGIONS
dc.subjectAGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT
dc.subjectAGRICULTURAL EMPLOYMENT
dc.subjectAGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION
dc.subjectATTRITION
dc.subjectBORROWING
dc.subjectCITIES
dc.subjectCOMMUNITIES
dc.subjectCONSUMER PRICE INDEX
dc.subjectCONSUMPTION EXPENDITURE
dc.subjectCOUNTRYSIDE
dc.subjectDEBT
dc.subjectDEMOCRACY
dc.subjectDEMOGRAPHIC
dc.subjectDEPOSITS
dc.subjectDESCRIPTION
dc.subjectDEVELOPING COUNTRIES
dc.subjectDEVELOPMENT RESEARCH GROUP
dc.subjectDIRECT PAYMENTS
dc.subjectDISTRIBUTION CHANNELS
dc.subjectECONOMIC BENEFITS
dc.subjectECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
dc.subjectECONOMIC REFORM
dc.subjectECONOMIC REFORMS
dc.subjectECONOMIC SHOCKS
dc.subjectECONOMICS
dc.subjectEMPLOYMENT
dc.subjectEMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITIES
dc.subjectFAMILY LABOR
dc.subjectFARM EMPLOYMENT
dc.subjectFARM INCOME
dc.subjectFARM OUTPUT
dc.subjectFARM PRICES
dc.subjectFARM WORK
dc.subjectFARMERS
dc.subjectFARMLAND
dc.subjectFINANCIAL ASSETS
dc.subjectFINANCIAL RETURN
dc.subjectGROWTH RATE
dc.subjectHIGHER INEQUALITY
dc.subjectHOUSEHOLD HEAD
dc.subjectHOUSEHOLD INCOME
dc.subjectHOUSEHOLD LEVEL
dc.subjectHOUSEHOLD PER CAPITA INCOME
dc.subjectHOUSEHOLD SIZE
dc.subjectHOUSEHOLD SURVEY
dc.subjectHOUSEHOLD SURVEY DATA
dc.subjectHOUSEHOLD SURVEYS
dc.subjectHOUSEHOLD WELFARE
dc.subjectHOUSEHOLD-LEVEL
dc.subjectHOUSEHOLDS
dc.subjectHOUSING
dc.subjectHUMAN CAPITAL
dc.subjectHUMAN DEVELOPMENT
dc.subjectINCOME
dc.subjectINCOME GAP
dc.subjectINCOME GROWTH
dc.subjectINCOME INEQUALITY
dc.subjectINCOMES
dc.subjectINEQUALITY
dc.subjectINFORMAL TRANSFERS
dc.subjectINTANGIBLES
dc.subjectINTRINSIC MOTIVATION
dc.subjectLABOR MARKET
dc.subjectLABOR MARKETS
dc.subjectLABOR SUPPLY
dc.subjectLABORERS
dc.subjectLAND RIGHTS
dc.subjectLEASING
dc.subjectLOCAL BANKS
dc.subjectMACRO ECONOMIC SHOCKS
dc.subjectMARKET INFORMATION
dc.subjectMARKET PRICES
dc.subjectMOBILITY
dc.subjectOPPORTUNITY COSTS
dc.subjectPOLITICAL ECONOMY
dc.subjectPOLITICAL INFLUENCE
dc.subjectPOOR
dc.subjectPREFERENTIAL ACCESS
dc.subjectPRIVATIZATION
dc.subjectREGRESSORS
dc.subjectREMOTE VILLAGES
dc.subjectRENTS
dc.subjectRURAL
dc.subjectRURAL AREAS
dc.subjectRURAL CONSUMER
dc.subjectRURAL ECONOMY
dc.subjectRURAL HOUSEHOLD
dc.subjectRURAL HOUSEHOLDS
dc.subjectRURAL LABOR
dc.subjectRURAL POPULATION
dc.subjectRURAL RESIDENTS
dc.subjectRURAL VILLAGES
dc.subjectSECRETARIES
dc.subjectSERVANTS
dc.subjectSHARE PRICES
dc.subjectSOCIAL PROTECTION
dc.subjectSTANDARD ERROR
dc.subjectSTANDARD ERRORS
dc.subjectSTATISTICAL SIGNIFICANCE
dc.subjectSUPPLIERS
dc.subjectTAX
dc.subjectTOWNS
dc.subjectTREASURY
dc.subjectURBAN AREAS
dc.subjectURBANIZATION
dc.subjectVILLAGE LEADERS
dc.subjectVILLAGE LEVEL
dc.subjectVILLAGES
dc.subjectWAGES
dc.subjectYOUTH
dc.titleDoes It Pay to Be a Cadre? Estimating the Returns to Being a Local Official in Rural China

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