MECHANISM DESIGN FOR NUTRIENT TRADING UNDER ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION

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dc.creatorJohansson, Robert C.
dc.date2017-04-01T18:51:32Z
dc.date.accessioned2026-07-09T03:31:54Z
dc.descriptionThe objective of this paper is to evaluate first- and second-best trading mechanisms for regulating point and nonpoint source phosphorus emissions. The trading mechanisms are differentiated on the degree to which regulators can observe abatement efforts. The deadweight losses attributable to informational asymmetries and those of the second-best mechanisms will provide regulators the shadow value of foregoing first-best measures.
dc.identifierdoi:10.22004/ag.econ.20558
dc.identifierhttps://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/20558/files/sp01jo01.pdf
dc.identifierhttp://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/20558
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/123456789/534388
dc.languageeng
dc.publisher
dc.sourcehttp://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/20558
dc.titleMECHANISM DESIGN FOR NUTRIENT TRADING UNDER ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION
dc.typeText

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