A Global Game with Strategic Substitutes and Complements
| dc.creator | Karp, Larry S. | |
| dc.creator | Lee, In Ho | |
| dc.creator | Mason, Robin | |
| dc.date | 2017-04-01T18:32:21Z | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2026-07-09T03:49:24Z | |
| dc.description | We study a global game in which actions are strategic complements over some region and strategic substitutes over another region. An agent's payoff depends on a market fundamental and the actions of other agents. If the degree of congestion is sufficiently large, agents' strategies are non-monotonic in their signal about the market fundamental. In this case, a signal that makes them believe that the market fundamental is more favorable for an action may make them less likely to take the action, because of the risk of overcrowding. | |
| dc.identifier | doi:10.22004/ag.econ.25014 | |
| dc.identifier | https://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/25014/files/wp030940.pdf | |
| dc.identifier | http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/25014 | |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/123456789/540435 | |
| dc.language | eng | |
| dc.publisher | ||
| dc.source | http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/25014 | |
| dc.title | A Global Game with Strategic Substitutes and Complements | |
| dc.type | Text |