Cooperation in polygynous households

dc.creatorBarr, Abigail
dc.creatorDekker, Marleen
dc.creatorJanssens, Wendy
dc.creatorKebede, Bereket
dc.creatorKramer, Berber
dc.date2019-04-16
dc.date2024-06-21T09:07:58Z
dc.date2024-06-21T09:07:58Z
dc.date.accessioned2026-06-27T15:28:11Z
dc.descriptionUsing a carefully designed series of public goods games, we compare, across monogamous and polygynous households, the willingness of husbands and wives to cooperate to maximize household gains. Compared to monogamous husbands and wives, polygynous husbands and wives are less cooperative, one with another, and co-wives are least cooperative, one with another. The husbands’ and wives’ behavior in a corresponding series of inter-household games indicates that these differences cannot be attributed to selection of less cooperative people into polygyny. Finally, behavior in polygynous households is more reciprocal and less apparently altruistic. (JEL C93, D13, J12, O12)
dc.identifierhttps://hdl.handle.net/10568/146655
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/123456789/105330
dc.languageen
dc.publisherAmerican Economic Association
dc.relationhttps://doi.org/10.2499/p15738coll2.133514
dc.rightsLimited Access
dc.sourceBarr, Abigail; Dekker, Marleen; Janssens, Wendy; Kebede, Bereket; and Kramer, Berber. 2019. Cooperation in polygynous households. American Economic Journal: Applied Economics 11(2): 266-283. https://doi.org/10.1257/app.20170438
dc.subjectpublic goods
dc.subjecthouseholds
dc.subjectexperimentation
dc.subjectmarriage
dc.subjectmonogamy
dc.subjectcooperation
dc.titleCooperation in polygynous households
dc.typeJournal Article

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