The Political Economy of Fiscal Policy After EMU

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dc.creatorEichengreen, Barry
dc.date2017-04-01T15:30:00Z
dc.date.accessioned2026-07-09T10:20:23Z
dc.descriptionThis paper considers the implications for fiscal policy of European Monetary Unification. Following an introduction, Section II describes and critiques the fiscal provisions of the Maastricht Treaty on Economic and Monetary Union. Section III considers the case for formal fiscal restraints and presents evidence on their effectiveness. Section IV presents a parallel analysis of the debate over fiscal federalism.
dc.identifierdoi:10.22004/ag.econ.233176
dc.identifierhttps://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/233176/files/cal-cider-c092-004.pdf
dc.identifierhttp://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/233176
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/123456789/617778
dc.languageeng
dc.publisher
dc.sourcehttp://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/233176
dc.titleThe Political Economy of Fiscal Policy After EMU
dc.typeText

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