The Theory of Price Collars: The Linking of Prices in a Market Channel to Redress the Exercise of Market Power

dc.creatorTian, Li
dc.creatorCotterill, Ronald
dc.date2017-04-01T17:56:58Z
dc.date.accessioned2026-07-09T07:05:56Z
dc.descriptionThe marketing channels for many goods involve the production of a raw commodity that is processed and then distributed to retailers for sale to consumers. Either the processing industry or the retailing industry or both may exercise substantial market powe r ultimately against raw commodity suppliers or consumer s, the disorganized (competitive) economic groups at the ends of the market channel. This paper develops a theory of price collars to regulate pricing in such a channel. Price collars link raw product, wholesale and retail prices but do not explicitly set such prices. For example, a wholesale price collar could limit the wholesale price to 140% of the raw commodity price, and a retail price collar could limit retail price to 130% of the wholesale price.
dc.identifierdoi:10.22004/ag.econ.149025
dc.identifierhttps://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/149025/files/rr91.pdf
dc.identifierhttp://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/149025
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/123456789/584488
dc.languageeng
dc.publisher
dc.sourcehttp://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/149025
dc.titleThe Theory of Price Collars: The Linking of Prices in a Market Channel to Redress the Exercise of Market Power
dc.typeText

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