Cooperation and Cheating

dc.creator	Cross, Robin M.
dc.creator	Buccola, Steven T.
dc.creator	Thomann, Enrique A.
dc.date	2017-04-01T20:02:46Z
dc.date.accessioned	2026-07-09T03:34:23Z
dc.description	In this article, we extend the variable delivery claim framework (Cross, Buccola, and Thomann, 2006) to examine the option-to-cheat, that is, the option to shift production between contracts ex post. We use this framework to provide a solution to the age-old conflict between enforcement and the cooperative tradition of providing a "home" for member produce. We show that, in contrast to Nourse's competitive yardstick hypothesis, the value of the cooperative-provided option increases as market competition intensifies. When the option-to-cheat is fairly-priced, it is Pareto improving, increasing grower returns, lowering cooperative per-unit costs and reducing contract shortfalls for investor-owned rivals at no additional per-unit cost. Our valuation framework is consistent with replication-based equilibria and is free from parametric specification of individual preference or firm cost structure.
dc.identifier	doi:10.22004/ag.econ.21158
dc.identifier	https://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/21158/files/os06cr01.pdf
dc.identifier	http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/21158
dc.identifier.uri	http://hdl.handle.net/123456789/535486
dc.language	eng
dc.publisher
dc.source	http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/21158
dc.title	Cooperation and Cheating
dc.type	Text

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