Price Insurance, Moral Hazard and Agri-environmental Policy
| dc.creator | Fraser, Rob W. | |
| dc.date | 2017-04-01T19:37:23Z | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2026-07-09T06:05:41Z | |
| dc.description | Motivated by recent EC proposals to “strengthen risk management tools” in the CAP in relation to farmers’ increased exposure to market price risk, this paper draws attention to a potential negative consequence of such a change in the CAP – an associated increase in cheating behaviour by farmers in the context of environmental stewardship. A theoretical framework for this policy problem is developed and used not just to illustrate the problem, but also to propose a solution – specifically to combine the introduction of CAP-supported policy changes which reduce farmers’ exposure to market-based risk with changes in environmental stewardship policies which increase the riskiness of cheating and thereby discourage such behaviour. | |
| dc.identifier | doi:10.22004/ag.econ.124305 | |
| dc.identifier | https://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/124305/files/2012AC%20Fraser%20CP.pdf | |
| dc.identifier | http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/124305 | |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/123456789/572277 | |
| dc.language | eng | |
| dc.publisher | ||
| dc.source | http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/124305 | |
| dc.title | Price Insurance, Moral Hazard and Agri-environmental Policy | |
| dc.type | Text |