TARGET PRICES, PAYMENT LIMITS AND NON-MARKET CONCERNS IN THE DESIGN OF U.S. AGRICULTURAL POLICY

Vista sencilla de ítem
dc.creatorHueth, Brent
dc.date2017-04-01T13:51:24Z
dc.date.accessioned2026-07-09T03:33:44Z
dc.descriptionThis paper examines the motivations underlying the government's choice of particular policy mechanisms for subsidizing agriculture. The analysis suggests that policies involving overproduction by relatively high-cost producers might arise from the perceived connection between the existence of relatively inefficient farm operations, and the preservation or sustainability of rural communities.
dc.identifierdoi:10.22004/ag.econ.20992
dc.identifierhttps://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/20992/files/sphuet02.pdf
dc.identifierhttp://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/20992
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/123456789/535172
dc.languageeng
dc.publisher
dc.sourcehttp://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/20992
dc.titleTARGET PRICES, PAYMENT LIMITS AND NON-MARKET CONCERNS IN THE DESIGN OF U.S. AGRICULTURAL POLICY
dc.typeText

Archivos

Colecciones

University of Minnesota