OPTIMAL CONTRACTS FOR EXPLORATION WITH COST RECOVERY OF AN EXHAUSTIBLE NATURAL RESOURCE UNDER ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION

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dc.creatorRahman, Shaikh Mahfuzur
dc.creatorHelal, Uddin
dc.date2017-04-01T19:54:52Z
dc.date.accessioned2026-07-09T03:30:28Z
dc.descriptionExploration of an exhaustible resource with cost recovery under asymmetric information about cost is modeled and analyzed employing Principal-Agent theory. Allocation of lower than full information level of effort for the high-cost firms is found socially optimal. However, distortion is less in a two-stage process of exploration and extraction.
dc.identifierdoi:10.22004/ag.econ.20180
dc.identifierhttps://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/20180/files/sp04ra04.pdf
dc.identifierhttp://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/20180
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/123456789/533757
dc.languageeng
dc.publisher
dc.sourcehttp://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/20180
dc.titleOPTIMAL CONTRACTS FOR EXPLORATION WITH COST RECOVERY OF AN EXHAUSTIBLE NATURAL RESOURCE UNDER ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION
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