Are Microcredit Borrowers in Bangladesh Over-indebted ?
| dc.creator | Faruqee, Rashid | |
| dc.creator | Khandker, Shahidur R. | |
| dc.creator | Samad, Hussain A. | |
| dc.date | 2013-10-02T13:59:22Z | |
| dc.date | 2013-10-02T13:59:22Z | |
| dc.date | 2013-08 | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2026-07-01T00:55:54Z | |
| dc.description | Microcredit programs in Bangladesh have experienced spectacular growth in recent years, with a growing number of borrowers availing credit from multiple microcredit agencies. There is a growing concern that if there are not sufficient returns to borrowing from microfinance institutions (MFIS), some borrowers might be taking loans that they will not be able to repay. A household may be considered over-indebted, for example, if its debt liability exceeds 40 percent of its income or assets. Using a long panel of household survey data from Bangladesh, the paper finds that some 26 percent of microcredit borrowers are over-indebted on this measure versus 22 percent of non-microcredit borrowers. Econometric analysis suggests that both MFI competition and multiple borrowing raise indebtedness. However, repeated borrowing, while it affects short-term liability adversely, does affect the long-term debt-asset ratio favorably. That is, repeated borrowing helps increase assets more than debt over time. Microcredit borrowers in Bangladesh are thus not necessarily over-indebted. But when borrowing is seen as protection against shocks such as floods even at the cost of being indebted, MFIs may offer micro-insurance schemes to safeguard borrowers against economic shocks. | |
| dc.format | application/pdf | |
| dc.format | text/plain | |
| dc.identifier | http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2013/08/18111659/microcredit-borrowers-bangladesh-over-indebted-microcredit-borrowers-bangladesh-over-indebted | |
| dc.identifier | https://hdl.handle.net/10986/16007 | |
| dc.identifier | https://doi.org/10.1596/1813-9450-6574 | |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/123456789/413129 | |
| dc.language | English | |
| dc.language | en_US | |
| dc.publisher | World Bank, Washington, DC | |
| dc.relation | Policy Research Working Paper;No. 6574 | |
| dc.rights | CC BY 3.0 IGO | |
| dc.rights | http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo/ | |
| dc.rights | World Bank | |
| dc.subject | ACCESS TO CREDIT | |
| dc.subject | ADVERSE EFFECT | |
| dc.subject | ADVERSE SHOCKS | |
| dc.subject | AGRICULTURAL BANKS | |
| dc.subject | AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT BANKS | |
| dc.subject | ARREARS | |
| dc.subject | ASSET RATIO | |
| dc.subject | ASSET VALUES | |
| dc.subject | BANK OF ENGLAND | |
| dc.subject | BANK POLICY | |
| dc.subject | BANKRUPT | |
| dc.subject | BIDS | |
| dc.subject | BORROWER | |
| dc.subject | BUFFER | |
| dc.subject | COMMERCIAL BANK | |
| dc.subject | COMMERCIAL BANKS | |
| dc.subject | CONSUMER CREDIT | |
| dc.subject | CONSUMER GOODS | |
| dc.subject | CONSUMER PROTECTION | |
| dc.subject | CONSUMPTION SMOOTHING | |
| dc.subject | CONTROL VARIABLES | |
| dc.subject | CREDIBILITY | |
| dc.subject | CREDIT BUREAUS | |
| dc.subject | CREDIT CONSTRAINT | |
| dc.subject | CREDIT CONSTRAINTS | |
| dc.subject | CREDIT LIMIT | |
| dc.subject | CREDIT LIMITS | |
| dc.subject | CREDIT MARKETS | |
| dc.subject | CREDIT PROGRAMS | |
| dc.subject | CREDIT RISKS | |
| dc.subject | CREDITWORTHINESS | |
| dc.subject | DEBT | |
| dc.subject | DEBT CONTRACTS | |
| dc.subject | DEBT LIABILITY | |
| dc.subject | DEBT PAYMENT | |
| dc.subject | DEBT PROBLEMS | |
| dc.subject | DEBT RATIOS | |
| dc.subject | DEBT SERVICE | |
| dc.subject | DEBT SERVICING | |
| dc.subject | DEBT SERVICING COSTS | |
| dc.subject | DEBTS | |
| dc.subject | DEFAULT CASES | |
| dc.subject | DEFAULTS | |
| dc.subject | DEMAND FOR CREDIT | |
| dc.subject | DEMAND-SIDE FACTORS | |
| dc.subject | DEPENDENCY RATIO | |
| dc.subject | DEPENDENT | |
| dc.subject | DEPENDENT VARIABLE | |
| dc.subject | DEPENDENTS | |
| dc.subject | DEPOSITS | |
| dc.subject | DEPRESSIONS | |
| dc.subject | DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS | |
| dc.subject | DEVELOPING COUNTRIES | |
| dc.subject | DISBURSEMENT | |
| dc.subject | DISBURSEMENTS | |
| dc.subject | ECONOMIC CRISIS | |
| dc.subject | ECONOMIC SHOCKS | |
| dc.subject | ENTREPRENEURSHIP | |
| dc.subject | ENVIRONMENTAL FACTORS | |
| dc.subject | EXPENDITURES | |
| dc.subject | EXPLANATORY VARIABLES | |
| dc.subject | EXPOSURE | |
| dc.subject | EXTERNAL FACTORS | |
| dc.subject | FEDERAL RESERVE | |
| dc.subject | FINANCIAL DISTRESS | |
| dc.subject | FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS | |
| dc.subject | FINANCIAL SERVICES | |
| dc.subject | FIXED EFFECTS | |
| dc.subject | FOREIGN CURRENCY | |
| dc.subject | FOREIGN CURRENCY MARKETS | |
| dc.subject | GOVERNMENT POLICIES | |
| dc.subject | HOLDING | |
| dc.subject | HOUSEHOLD DEBT | |
| dc.subject | HOUSEHOLD DEBTS | |
| dc.subject | HOUSEHOLD INCOME | |
| dc.subject | INCIDENCE OF INDEBTEDNESS | |
| dc.subject | INCOME GENERATION | |
| dc.subject | INCOME-GENERATING ACTIVITIES | |
| dc.subject | INCOMES | |
| dc.subject | INDEBTED | |
| dc.subject | INDEBTED HOUSEHOLDS | |
| dc.subject | INDEBTEDNESS | |
| dc.subject | INDIVIDUAL ACCOUNTS | |
| dc.subject | INFORMAL LOANS | |
| dc.subject | INSOLVENCY | |
| dc.subject | INSOLVENT | |
| dc.subject | INSTITUTIONAL ENVIRONMENT | |
| dc.subject | INSTRUMENT | |
| dc.subject | INTEREST RATE | |
| dc.subject | INTEREST RATES | |
| dc.subject | INTERNATIONAL BANK | |
| dc.subject | INVESTMENT OPPORTUNITY | |
| dc.subject | IRRESPONSIBLE BORROWING | |
| dc.subject | JUDGMENT | |
| dc.subject | JUDICIAL EFFICIENCY | |
| dc.subject | LAND ASSET | |
| dc.subject | LAND ASSETS | |
| dc.subject | LEGAL ENVIRONMENT | |
| dc.subject | LENDER | |
| dc.subject | LENDERS | |
| dc.subject | LEVEL OF INDEBTEDNESS | |
| dc.subject | LEVEL OF REPAYMENT | |
| dc.subject | LIABILITY | |
| dc.subject | LIQUIDITY | |
| dc.subject | LIQUIDITY PROBLEMS | |
| dc.subject | LOAN | |
| dc.subject | LOAN AGREEMENTS | |
| dc.subject | LOAN AMOUNT | |
| dc.subject | LOAN APPROVALS | |
| dc.subject | LOAN CONTRACTS | |
| dc.subject | LOAN MATURITY | |
| dc.subject | LOAN PAYMENT | |
| dc.subject | LOAN PORTFOLIO | |
| dc.subject | LOAN PORTFOLIOS | |
| dc.subject | LONG-TERM BORROWING | |
| dc.subject | LONG-TERM DEBT | |
| dc.subject | MARKET INFORMATION | |
| dc.subject | MATURITIES | |
| dc.subject | MICRO CREDIT | |
| dc.subject | MICRO-CREDIT | |
| dc.subject | MICRO-INSURANCE | |
| dc.subject | MICROCREDIT | |
| dc.subject | MICROFINANCE | |
| dc.subject | MICROFINANCE INSTITUTION | |
| dc.subject | MICROFINANCE INSTITUTIONS | |
| dc.subject | NATURAL DISASTERS | |
| dc.subject | NET ASSETS | |
| dc.subject | NET SAVINGS | |
| dc.subject | OUTSTANDING LOANS | |
| dc.subject | PAYMENT OBLIGATIONS | |
| dc.subject | PAYMENT SERVICES | |
| dc.subject | PORTFOLIO GROWTH | |
| dc.subject | POVERTY ALLEVIATION | |
| dc.subject | POVERTY REDUCTION | |
| dc.subject | PRIVATE INVESTMENT | |
| dc.subject | PRODUCTIVE INVESTMENTS | |
| dc.subject | RATES OF INTEREST | |
| dc.subject | REGULATORY REFORM | |
| dc.subject | REORGANIZATION | |
| dc.subject | REPAYMENT | |
| dc.subject | REPAYMENT BEHAVIOR | |
| dc.subject | REPAYMENT CAPACITY | |
| dc.subject | REPAYMENT RATES | |
| dc.subject | REPAYMENTS | |
| dc.subject | RETURN | |
| dc.subject | RETURNS | |
| dc.subject | RISK MANAGEMENT | |
| dc.subject | RISK MANAGEMENT STRATEGIES | |
| dc.subject | SEIZURE | |
| dc.subject | SEIZURE OF ASSETS | |
| dc.subject | SHOCKS TO INCOME | |
| dc.subject | SHORT-TERM LIABILITY | |
| dc.subject | STANDARD DEVIATIONS | |
| dc.subject | STOCKS | |
| dc.subject | SUPPLY OF CREDIT | |
| dc.subject | SUPPLY SIDE | |
| dc.subject | SUPPLY SIDES | |
| dc.subject | SUPPLY-SIDE | |
| dc.subject | SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT | |
| dc.subject | UNSECURED DEBT | |
| dc.subject | VALUE OF ASSETS | |
| dc.subject | WAGE RATES | |
| dc.subject | poverty | |
| dc.title | Are Microcredit Borrowers in Bangladesh Over-indebted ? |
