The Consequences of Co-benefits for the Efficient Design of Carbon Sequestration Programs
| dc.creator | Feng, Hongli | |
| dc.creator | Kling, Catherine L. | |
| dc.date | 2017-04-01T19:17:11Z | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2026-07-09T03:24:14Z | |
| dc.description | In this paper, we study the social efficiency of private carbon markets that include trading in agricultural soil carbon sequestration when there are significant co-benefits (positive environmental externalities) associated with the practices that sequester carbon. Likewise, we investigate the efficiency of government-run conservation programs that are designed to promote a broad array of environmental attributes (both carbon sequestration and its co-benefits) for the supply of carbon. Finally, policy design and efficiency issues associated with the potential interplay between a private carbon market and a government conservation program are studied. Empirical analyses for an area that represents a significant potential source of carbon sequestration and its associated co-benefits illustrate the magnitude and complexity of these issues in real-world policy design. | |
| dc.identifier | doi:10.22004/ag.econ.18415 | |
| dc.identifier | https://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/18415/files/wp050390.pdf | |
| dc.identifier | http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/18415 | |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/123456789/531948 | |
| dc.language | eng | |
| dc.publisher | ||
| dc.source | http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/18415 | |
| dc.title | The Consequences of Co-benefits for the Efficient Design of Carbon Sequestration Programs | |
| dc.type | Text |