DESIGNING NONPOINT SOURCE POLLUTION POLICIES WITH LIMITED INFORMATION ABOUT BOTH RISK ATTITUDES AND PRODUCTION TECHNOLOGY

Vista sencilla de ítem
dc.creatorPeterson, Jeffrey M.
dc.creatorBoisvert, Richard N.
dc.date2017-04-01T14:34:10Z
dc.date.accessioned2026-07-09T03:32:38Z
dc.descriptionA pollution reduction program is designed where information about both technology and risk preferences is asymmetric. Program costs and the distribution of payments depend on the amount of information known to the policy maker. Empirically testable conditions for self-selection are derived; the method is applied to reducing nitrate contamination.
dc.identifierdoi:10.22004/ag.econ.20720
dc.identifierhttps://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/20720/files/sp01pe03.pdf
dc.identifierhttp://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/20720
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/123456789/534700
dc.languageeng
dc.publisher
dc.sourcehttp://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/20720
dc.titleDESIGNING NONPOINT SOURCE POLLUTION POLICIES WITH LIMITED INFORMATION ABOUT BOTH RISK ATTITUDES AND PRODUCTION TECHNOLOGY
dc.typeText

Archivos

Colecciones

University of Minnesota