MECHANISMS FOR ADDRESSING THIRD-PARTY IMPACTS RESULTING FROM VOLUNTARY WATER TRANSFERS
| dc.creator | Murphy, James J. | |
| dc.creator | Dinar, Ariel | |
| dc.creator | Howitt, Richard E. | |
| dc.creator | Mastrangelo, Erin | |
| dc.creator | Rassenti, Stephen J. | |
| dc.creator | Smith, Vernon L. | |
| dc.date | 2017-04-01T19:43:54Z | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2026-07-09T03:29:07Z | |
| dc.description | This research uses laboratory experiments to test alternative water market institutions designed to protect third-party interests. The institutions tested include taxing mechanisms that raise revenue to compensate affected third-parties, and a free market in which third-parties actively participate. We also discuss the likely implications of a command-and-control approach in which there are fixed limits on the volume of water that may be exported from a region. The results indicate that there are some important trade-offs in selecting a policy option. Although theoretically optimal, active third-party participation in the market is likely to result in free-riding that may erode some or all of the efficiency gains, and may introduce volatility into the market. Fixed limits on water exports are likely to result in a more stable market, but the constraints on exports will result in lower levels of social welfare. Taxing transfers and compensating third-parties offers a promising balance of efficiency, equity and market stability. | |
| dc.identifier | doi:10.22004/ag.econ.19812 | |
| dc.identifier | https://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/19812/files/sp02mu04.pdf | |
| dc.identifier | http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/19812 | |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/123456789/533342 | |
| dc.language | eng | |
| dc.publisher | ||
| dc.source | http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/19812 | |
| dc.title | MECHANISMS FOR ADDRESSING THIRD-PARTY IMPACTS RESULTING FROM VOLUNTARY WATER TRANSFERS | |
| dc.type | Text |