Incomplete Contracts and Investment : A Study of Land Tenancy in Pakistan

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dc.creatorJacoby, Hanan G.
dc.creatorMansuri, Ghazala
dc.date2012-06-22T19:14:20Z
dc.date2012-06-22T19:14:20Z
dc.date2006-02
dc.date.accessioned2026-07-01T01:28:22Z
dc.descriptionWhen contracts are incomplete, relationship-specific investments may be underprovided due to the threat of opportunistic expropriation or holdup. The authors find evidence of such underinvestment on tenanted land in rural Pakistan. Using data from households cultivating multiple plots under different tenure arrangements, they show that land-specific investment is lower on leased plots. This result is robust to the possible effects of asymmetric information in the leasing market. Greater tenure security also increases land-specific investment on leased plots. Moreover, variation in tenure security appears to be driven largely by heterogeneity across landlords, suggesting that reputation may be important in mitigating the holdup problem.
dc.formatapplication/pdf
dc.formattext/plain
dc.identifierhttp://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2006/02/6541576/incomplete-contracts-investment-study-land-tenancy-pakistan
dc.identifierhttps://hdl.handle.net/10986/8825
dc.identifierhttps://doi.org/10.1596/1813-9450-3826
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/123456789/418399
dc.languageEnglish
dc.publisherWorld Bank, Washington, DC
dc.relationPolicy Research Working Paper; No. 3826
dc.rightsCC BY 3.0 IGO
dc.rightshttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo/
dc.rightsWorld Bank
dc.subjectADVERSE SELECTION
dc.subjectAGRICULTURAL LAND
dc.subjectAGRICULTURE
dc.subjectASYMMETRIC INFORMATION
dc.subjectCONTRACT THEORY
dc.subjectCONTRACTUAL ARRANGEMENTS
dc.subjectCOST FUNCTIONS
dc.subjectCREDIT
dc.subjectDISCOUNT RATE
dc.subjectDISECONOMIES OF SCALE
dc.subjectEVICTION
dc.subjectEXPROPRIATION
dc.subjectHOUSEHOLDS
dc.subjectHUMAN CAPITAL
dc.subjectINCENTIVE EFFECTS
dc.subjectINCOMPLETE CONTRACTS
dc.subjectINEFFICIENCY
dc.subjectINVESTMENT BEHAVIOR
dc.subjectINVESTMENT INCENTIVES
dc.subjectLAND TENURE
dc.subjectLANDLORD
dc.subjectLANDLORDS
dc.subjectLANDOWNERS
dc.subjectLEASE
dc.subjectLEASING
dc.subjectLIABILITY
dc.subjectMAXIMUM LIKELIHOOD ESTIMATION
dc.subjectMORAL HAZARD
dc.subjectOPPORTUNITY COST
dc.subjectOPTIMAL CONTRACT
dc.subjectPRODUCTION EFFICIENCY
dc.subjectPRODUCTION FUNCTION
dc.subjectPROPERTY RIGHTS
dc.subjectRENTS
dc.subjectRETURN ON INVESTMENT
dc.subjectRISK
dc.subjectRISK AVERSION
dc.subjectRISK-NEUTRAL
dc.subjectSTATEMENTS
dc.subjectTENANCY
dc.subjectTENANTS
dc.subjectWEALTH
dc.titleIncomplete Contracts and Investment : A Study of Land Tenancy in Pakistan

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