OPTIONAL UNIT POLICY IN CROP INSURANCE
| dc.creator | Shaik, Saleem | |
| dc.creator | Atwood, Joseph A. | |
| dc.date | 2017-04-01T13:49:05Z | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2026-07-09T03:28:50Z | |
| dc.description | Utilizing ordered logit we examine the presence of two kinds of asymmetric information-adverse selection (intertemporal variability) and moral hazard (interspatial and/or residual variability) as revealed by the choice of optional units in Federal crop insurance utilizing Risk Management Agency's 1996-2000 cotton yield and loss data files. Further, a tobit model is estimated to examine the factors explaining the loss cost ratio from Risk Management Agency perspective. Potential costs of adverse selection and/or moral hazard in optional unit provision are estimated to be as high as $180 million in US cotton over the 1996-2000 period. Keywords: Adverse Selection, Moral Hazard, Optional Unit Policy, Crop Insurance, U.S. Cotton, Logit and Tobit models. | |
| dc.identifier | doi:10.22004/ag.econ.19741 | |
| dc.identifier | https://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/19741/files/sp02sh03.pdf | |
| dc.identifier | http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/19741 | |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/123456789/533271 | |
| dc.language | eng | |
| dc.publisher | ||
| dc.source | http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/19741 | |
| dc.title | OPTIONAL UNIT POLICY IN CROP INSURANCE | |
| dc.type | Text |