Welfare and Environmental Effects of Subsidies and Tariffs in North-South Trade in Renewable Energy Equipment

dc.creatorWei, Wenjie
dc.date2017-04-01T17:07:13Z
dc.date.accessioned2026-07-09T07:54:38Z
dc.descriptionA two-country, three-good general equilibrium model is developed to examine the welfare and environmental effects for countries (North and South) of demand subsidies (a feed-in tariff) to renewable energy equipment, as well as tariffs on renewable energy equipment imports. Both North and South renewable energy equipment producers engage in Cournot duopoly competition with a homogeneous product in both countries. Both countries also produce polluting fossilfuel- generated electricity and a numeraire good. We show, inter alia, that an endogenous Northern import tariff is increasing in (independent of) a Northern (Southern) feed-in tariff premium, even if the North government does not internalize any pollution harm. A Northern feed-in tariff premium may hurt domestic environment due to a rebound effect and it may also hurt Southern welfare.1
dc.identifierdoi:10.22004/ag.econ.165887
dc.identifierhttps://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/165887/files/Wei%20SP.pdf
dc.identifierhttp://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/165887
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/123456789/593513
dc.languageeng
dc.publisher
dc.sourcehttp://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/165887
dc.titleWelfare and Environmental Effects of Subsidies and Tariffs in North-South Trade in Renewable Energy Equipment
dc.typeText

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