When the fire ends: Straw burning, regulation, and pollution substitution

Vista sencilla de ítem
dc.creatorHong, Hai
dc.creatorChen, Kevin Z.
dc.date2026-04
dc.date2026-03-06T15:02:10Z
dc.date2026-03-06T15:02:10Z
dc.date.accessioned2026-06-27T15:22:22Z
dc.descriptionEnvironmental regulations can trigger unintended pollution externalities if they lack well-designed economic incentives or fail to account for the responses of polluters. This paper examines the effectiveness and unintended consequences of the Universal Prohibition on Straw Burning (UPSB) policy in China. By exploiting a generalized difference-in-differences design, we find that the UPSB policy significantly reduces agricultural fires and air pollution through top-down campaign-style enforcement. However, as straw burning is commonly used to kill pests and fertilize the soil, the UPSB policy also increases the use of chemical fertilizers and pesticides, leading to magnified water pollution. Cost-benefit analysis suggests that much of the health benefit from improved air quality is offset by the health cost from degraded water quality. Our findings highlight the importance of considering the potential responses of individuals subject to the regulation when conducting policy evaluation.
dc.identifierhttps://hdl.handle.net/10568/181980
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/123456789/102424
dc.languageen
dc.publisherElsevier
dc.rightsOpen Access
dc.sourceHong, Hai; and Chen, Kevin Z. 2026. When the fire ends: Straw burning, regulation, and pollution substitution. Journal of Development Economics 181(April 2026): 103727. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jdeveco.2026.103727
dc.subjectstraw
dc.subjectburning
dc.subjectregulations
dc.subjectpollution control
dc.subjectpollution prevention
dc.subjectair pollution
dc.subjectwater pollution
dc.titleWhen the fire ends: Straw burning, regulation, and pollution substitution
dc.typeJournal Article

Archivos

Colecciones

Instituto Internacional de Investigación sobre Políticas Alimentarias (IFPRI)