DOUBLE DIPPING IN POLLUTION MARKETS
| dc.creator | Woodward, Richard T. | |
| dc.creator | Han, Manseung | |
| dc.date | 2017-04-01T14:53:41Z | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2026-07-09T03:31:01Z | |
| dc.description | We explore the efficiency of allowing participants in transferable-rights programs to sell credits in multiple markets, i.e., to double dip. In a first-best economy double-dipping is efficient, but if the cap is set suboptimally, then the answer depends on the relative slopes of the marginal benefit and marginal cost curves. | |
| dc.identifier | doi:10.22004/ag.econ.20323 | |
| dc.identifier | https://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/20323/files/sp04wo01.pdf | |
| dc.identifier | http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/20323 | |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/123456789/533992 | |
| dc.language | eng | |
| dc.publisher | ||
| dc.source | http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/20323 | |
| dc.title | DOUBLE DIPPING IN POLLUTION MARKETS | |
| dc.type | Text |