Meeting the Competition: Commitment and Competitive Behavior
| dc.creator | Kao, Tina | |
| dc.creator | Menezes, Flavio | |
| dc.creator | Quiggin, John | |
| dc.date | 2017-04-01T14:10:30Z | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2026-07-09T07:12:35Z | |
| dc.description | In this paper, we represent 'meet the competition' guarantees as the endogenous outcome of a non-cooperative game. We model the phenomenon by assuming that firms compete in supply schedules in a two-stage process. We assume that the choice of a negatively sloped supply schedule is costly. In particular, we use Cournot behavior as a benchmark. Cournot competition entails firms choosing a fixed quantity independent of the mar- ket price. We assume that it is costly for firms to deviate from a fixed output level. Our main result shows that in equilibrium, firms behave less competitively than the Cournot benchmark when they are able to commit to a degree of responsiveness in the first stage of the competition game. | |
| dc.identifier | doi:10.22004/ag.econ.151205 | |
| dc.identifier | https://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/151205/files/RSMG%20Working%20Paper%20R12_6.pdf | |
| dc.identifier | http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/151205 | |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/123456789/585697 | |
| dc.language | eng | |
| dc.publisher | ||
| dc.source | http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/151205 | |
| dc.title | Meeting the Competition: Commitment and Competitive Behavior | |
| dc.type | Text |