Equilibrium management of fisheries with altruistic overlapping generations
| dc.creator | Ekeland, Ivar | |
| dc.creator | Karp, Larry S. | |
| dc.creator | Sumaila, Ussif Rashid | |
| dc.date | 2017-04-01T18:07:44Z | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2026-07-09T06:03:36Z | |
| dc.description | We imbed a classic fishery model, where the optimal policy follows a Most Rapid Approach Path to a steady state, into an overlapping generations setting. The current generation discounts future generations’ utility flows at a rate possibly different from the pure rate of time preference used to discount their own utility flows. The resulting model has non-constant discount rates, leading to time inconsistency. The unique Markov Perfect equilibrium to this model has a striking feature: provided that the current generation has some concern for the not-yet born, the equilibrium policy does not depend on the degree of that concern. | |
| dc.identifier | doi:10.22004/ag.econ.123635 | |
| dc.identifier | https://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/123635/files/Karp%20CUDARE%201124%20.pdf | |
| dc.identifier | http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/123635 | |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/123456789/571804 | |
| dc.language | eng | |
| dc.publisher | ||
| dc.source | http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/123635 | |
| dc.title | Equilibrium management of fisheries with altruistic overlapping generations | |
| dc.type | Text |
