Equilibrium management of fisheries with altruistic overlapping generations

dc.creatorEkeland, Ivar
dc.creatorKarp, Larry S.
dc.creatorSumaila, Ussif Rashid
dc.date2017-04-01T18:07:44Z
dc.date.accessioned2026-07-09T06:03:36Z
dc.descriptionWe imbed a classic fishery model, where the optimal policy follows a Most Rapid Approach Path to a steady state, into an overlapping generations setting. The current generation discounts future generations’ utility flows at a rate possibly different from the pure rate of time preference used to discount their own utility flows. The resulting model has non-constant discount rates, leading to time inconsistency. The unique Markov Perfect equilibrium to this model has a striking feature: provided that the current generation has some concern for the not-yet born, the equilibrium policy does not depend on the degree of that concern.
dc.identifierdoi:10.22004/ag.econ.123635
dc.identifierhttps://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/123635/files/Karp%20CUDARE%201124%20.pdf
dc.identifierhttp://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/123635
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/123456789/571804
dc.languageeng
dc.publisher
dc.sourcehttp://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/123635
dc.titleEquilibrium management of fisheries with altruistic overlapping generations
dc.typeText

Archivos