Hidden action, risk aversion and variable fines in agri-environmental schemes
| dc.creator | Ozanne, Adam | |
| dc.creator | White, Benedict | |
| dc.date | 2017-04-01T19:42:15Z | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2026-07-09T05:52:21Z | |
| dc.description | This note analyses the design of agri-environmental schemes for risk-averse producers whose input usage is only observable by costly monitoring. The scheme penalises producers in proportion to input use in excess of a quota. A striking result is that if the scheme is designed in such a way that producers always comply with the quota, risk aversion is not relevant in determining the level of input use. | |
| dc.identifier | doi:10.22004/ag.econ.118539 | |
| dc.identifier | https://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/118539/files/j.1467-8489.2008.00408.x.pdf | |
| dc.identifier | http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/118539 | |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/123456789/569450 | |
| dc.language | eng | |
| dc.publisher | ||
| dc.source | http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/118539 | |
| dc.title | Hidden action, risk aversion and variable fines in agri-environmental schemes | |
| dc.type | Text |