Food Aid and the WTO: Can New Rules Be Effective?

dc.creatorCardwell, Ryan T.
dc.date2017-04-01T19:23:32Z
dc.date.accessioned2026-07-09T02:47:27Z
dc.descriptionA new Agreement on Agriculture from the Doha Development Agenda negotiations is certain to contain binding rules on food aid shipments. Negotiating parties are concerned that food aid has been used as a form of export competition policy, and they seek the use of coercive WTO legislation to prevent the disposal of surplus agricultural commodities as food aid. Current Uruguay Round food aid guidelines are contrasted with the most recent Doha Development Agenda proposals, and the prospective effectiveness of new rules is assessed. Food aid rules will be difficult to enforce within the WTO’s Dispute Settlement Understanding. Also, exogenous policy changes in donor countries are reducing the relevance of rules that target food aid as a means of surplus disposal. The future of international food aid governance in the event of a Doha Round collapse is also discussed.
dc.identifierdoi:10.22004/ag.econ.6313
dc.identifierhttps://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/6313/files/09010074.pdf
dc.identifierhttp://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/6313
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/123456789/520060
dc.languageeng
dc.publisher
dc.sourcehttp://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/6313
dc.titleFood Aid and the WTO: Can New Rules Be Effective?
dc.typeText

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