Auctioning Monopoly Franchises: Award Criteria and Service Launch Requirements
| dc.creator | Dosi, Cesare | |
| dc.creator | Moretto, Michele | |
| dc.date | 2017-04-01T19:20:20Z | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2026-07-09T04:47:00Z | |
| dc.description | We study the competition to acquire the exclusive right to operate an infrastructure service, by comparing two different specifications for the financial proposals - "lowest price to consumers" vs "highest concession fee", and two alternative contractual arrangements: a contract which imposes the obligation to immediately undertake the investment required to operate the concessioned service and a contract which simply assigns to the winning bidder the right to supply the market at a date of her choosing. By comparing the returns of these alternative award criteria and concessioning conditions, we show that concessioning without imposing rollout time limits may or may not provide a higher expected social value, depending on the bidding rule used to allocate the contract. In turn, the relative advantages of each award criterion are affected by the concessioning conditions. | |
| dc.identifier | doi:10.22004/ag.econ.50409 | |
| dc.identifier | https://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/50409/files/23-09.pdf | |
| dc.identifier | http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/50409 | |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/123456789/554808 | |
| dc.language | eng | |
| dc.publisher | ||
| dc.source | http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/50409 | |
| dc.title | Auctioning Monopoly Franchises: Award Criteria and Service Launch Requirements | |
| dc.type | Text |