Explaining Agricultural Distortion Patterns

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dc.creatorDutt, Pushan
dc.creatorMitra, Devashish
dc.date2017-09-07T16:34:28Z
dc.date2017-09-07T16:34:28Z
dc.date2009-05
dc.date.accessioned2026-07-01T00:33:39Z
dc.descriptionIn this paper, the authors examine the political economy drivers of the variation in agricultural protection, both across countries and within countries over time. The paper starts by listing the key insights provided by both the theoretical and empirical literature on the political economy of trade policy formulation. The authors then set out a basic framework that allows us to put forth various testable hypotheses on the variation and evolution of agricultural protection. The authors find that both the political ideology of the government and the degree of income inequality are important determinants of agricultural protection. Thus, both the political-support-function approach as well as the median-voter approach can be used in explaining the variation in agricultural protection across countries and within countries over time. The results are consistent with the predictions of a model that assumes that labor is specialized and sector-specific in nature. Some aspects of protection also seem to be consistent with predictions of a lobbying model in that agricultural protection is negatively related to agricultural employment and positively related to agricultural productivity. Public finance aspects of protection also seem to be empirically important.
dc.formatapplication/pdf
dc.formattext/plain
dc.identifierhttp://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/704051468336324311/Explaining-agricultural-distortion-patterns-the-roles-of-ideology-inequality-lobbying-and-public-finance
dc.identifierhttps://hdl.handle.net/10986/28159
dc.identifierhttps://doi.org/10.1596/28159
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/123456789/406114
dc.languageEnglish
dc.languageen_US
dc.publisherWorld Bank, Washington, DC
dc.relationAgricultural Distortions Working Paper;84
dc.rightsCC BY 3.0 IGO
dc.rightshttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo
dc.rightsWorld Bank
dc.subjectABSOLUTE VALUE
dc.subjectAGRICULTURAL TRADE
dc.subjectAGRICULTURE
dc.subjectASSET DISTRIBUTION
dc.subjectASSET INEQUALITY
dc.subjectAUCTIONS
dc.subjectBARRIER
dc.subjectBARRIERS ON IMPORTS
dc.subjectCAMPAIGN CONTRIBUTIONS
dc.subjectCAPITAL GAINS
dc.subjectCAPITAL-ABUNDANT COUNTRIES
dc.subjectCHECKS AND BALANCES
dc.subjectCOMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE
dc.subjectCOMPARATIVE POLITICAL ECONOMY
dc.subjectCONSTANT RETURNS
dc.subjectCONSTANT RETURNS TO SCALE
dc.subjectCONSUMER SURPLUS
dc.subjectCONSUMERS
dc.subjectCOUNTRY SIZE
dc.subjectCOUNTRY-SPECIFIC EFFECTS
dc.subjectCROSS-COUNTRY DATA
dc.subjectDATA SET
dc.subjectDECREASING FUNCTION
dc.subjectDEMOCRACIES
dc.subjectDEMOCRACY
dc.subjectDEPENDENT VARIABLE
dc.subjectDEVELOPED COUNTRIES
dc.subjectDEVELOPING COUNTRIES
dc.subjectDEVELOPING COUNTRY
dc.subjectDEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS
dc.subjectDICTATORSHIP
dc.subjectDOMESTIC PRICE
dc.subjectECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
dc.subjectECONOMIC EFFICIENCY
dc.subjectECONOMIC FACTORS
dc.subjectECONOMIC GROWTH
dc.subjectECONOMIC MODELS
dc.subjectECONOMIC REVIEW
dc.subjectECONOMICS
dc.subjectECONOMY LITERATURE
dc.subjectELASTICITY
dc.subjectEMPIRICAL APPLICATION
dc.subjectEMPIRICAL APPROACHES
dc.subjectEMPIRICAL LITERATURE
dc.subjectEMPIRICAL RESULTS
dc.subjectEMPIRICAL SUPPORT
dc.subjectEMPIRICAL WORK
dc.subjectEQUILIBRIUM
dc.subjectEQUILIBRIUM TARIFF
dc.subjectEXPLANATORY VARIABLES
dc.subjectEXPORT SUBSIDY
dc.subjectEXPORT SUPPLY
dc.subjectEXPORTS
dc.subjectFREE TRADE
dc.subjectFUTURE RESEARCH
dc.subjectGDP
dc.subjectGDP PER CAPITA
dc.subjectGINI COEFFICIENT
dc.subjectGLOBALIZATION
dc.subjectIDEOLOGY
dc.subjectIMPORT COMPETITION
dc.subjectIMPORT PROTECTION
dc.subjectINCOME
dc.subjectINCOME INEQUALITY
dc.subjectINCOME LEVELS
dc.subjectINCOME TAXES
dc.subjectINCREASING FUNCTION
dc.subjectINCUMBENT
dc.subjectINDUSTRIAL COUNTRIES
dc.subjectINEQUALITY
dc.subjectINEQUALITY MEASURE
dc.subjectINEQUALITY WILL INCREASE
dc.subjectINTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS
dc.subjectINTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION
dc.subjectINTERNATIONAL TRADE
dc.subjectLABOR FORCE
dc.subjectLAND INEQUALITY
dc.subjectLEGAL SYSTEM
dc.subjectLOBBYING
dc.subjectLONG-RUN POLICY
dc.subjectMARKET ACCESS
dc.subjectMARKET CONDITIONS
dc.subjectMEASURING INCOME INEQUALITY
dc.subjectMEDIAN VOTER
dc.subjectNEGATIVE SIGN
dc.subjectNOMINAL RATE
dc.subjectNON-TARIFF BARRIERS
dc.subjectOLD ISSUES
dc.subjectOPEN ECONOMIES
dc.subjectOUTPUT
dc.subjectPER CAPITA INCOME
dc.subjectPER CAPITA INCOMES
dc.subjectPOLICY CHANGES
dc.subjectPOLITICAL ACTIVITY
dc.subjectPOLITICAL CONFLICT
dc.subjectPOLITICAL ECONOMY
dc.subjectPOLITICAL ECONOMY MODELS
dc.subjectPOLITICAL ECONOMY OF TRADE
dc.subjectPOLITICAL ECONOMY OF TRADE POLICY
dc.subjectPOLITICAL INSTITUTIONS
dc.subjectPOLITICAL REGIME
dc.subjectPOLITICAL SCIENCE
dc.subjectPOOR COUNTRIES
dc.subjectPRODUCTIVITY
dc.subjectPROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION
dc.subjectPROTECTIONISM
dc.subjectPROTECTIONIST
dc.subjectPUBLIC FINANCE
dc.subjectREAL WAGES
dc.subjectREGULATION OF TRADE
dc.subjectSIGNIFICANT IMPROVEMENT
dc.subjectTARIFF BARRIERS
dc.subjectTARIFF FORMATION
dc.subjectTARIFF RATES
dc.subjectTARIFF STRUCTURE
dc.subjectTAX
dc.subjectTAX REVENUE
dc.subjectTAX REVENUES
dc.subjectTAXATION
dc.subjectTERMS OF TRADE
dc.subjectTRADE BARRIERS
dc.subjectTRADE ISSUES
dc.subjectTRADE LEGISLATION
dc.subjectTRADE LIBERALIZATION
dc.subjectTRADE MODELS
dc.subjectTRADE POLICIES
dc.subjectTRADE POLICY
dc.subjectTRADE POLICY FORMULATION
dc.subjectTRADE PROTECTION
dc.subjectTRADE REFORMS
dc.subjectTRADE RESTRICTIONS
dc.subjectTRANSPARENCY
dc.subjectUNEMPLOYMENT
dc.subjectUNEMPLOYMENT RATE
dc.subjectUNSKILLED LABOR
dc.subjectWAGES
dc.subjectWORLD DEVELOPMENT INDICATORS
dc.subjectWORLD TRADE
dc.titleExplaining Agricultural Distortion Patterns
dc.titleThe Roles of Ideology, Inequality, Lobbying and Public Finance
dc.typeWorking Paper
dc.typeDocument de travail
dc.typeDocumento de trabajo

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