Vertical Differentiation and Credence Goods: Harmonized Labeling and Gains from International Integration

Vista sencilla de ítem
dc.creatorSheldon, Ian M.
dc.creatorRoe, Brian E.
dc.date2017-04-01T17:45:36Z
dc.date.accessioned2026-07-09T02:47:31Z
dc.descriptionUsing a model of vertical product differentiation, we show under what institutional circumstances welfare gains will be maximized as economies integrate and harmonize labeling and certification policies for credence goods. Specifically, we show that harmonized mandatory, exclusive discrete labeling will not maximize the gains from economic integration, i.e., the choice of labeling regime can have a negative effect on market structure if firms choose to exit, reducing the range and quality of goods in the integrated market.
dc.identifierdoi:10.22004/ag.econ.6340
dc.identifierhttps://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/6340/files/469920.pdf
dc.identifierhttp://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/6340
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/123456789/520087
dc.languageeng
dc.publisher
dc.sourcehttp://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/6340
dc.titleVertical Differentiation and Credence Goods: Harmonized Labeling and Gains from International Integration
dc.typeText

Archivos

Colecciones

University of Minnesota