“Moving umbrella”: Bureaucratic transfers and the comovement of interregional investments in China

dc.creatorShi, Xiangyu
dc.creatorXi, Tianyang
dc.creatorZhang, Xiaobo
dc.creatorZhang, Yifan
dc.date2021-11-01
dc.date2024-05-22T12:10:52Z
dc.date2024-05-22T12:10:52Z
dc.date.accessioned2026-06-27T15:16:47Z
dc.descriptionThis paper studies the pattern of interregional investment after bureaucratic transfers across Chinese cities. Using the administrative records of business registration, we find that the transfer of a local leader between prefecture cities is associated with about 3% increase in interregional investment along the direction of transfer. The comoving firms purchase larger parcels of land and at lower prices. They also exhibit a higher likelihood of exiting when the patrons leave the office. Comoving interregional investment does not increase the probability of promotion for transferred leaders, yet expose them to a higher risk of anticorruption prosecution. The findings highlight the importance of personal connection between firms and bureaucrats in shaping the pattern of interregional investment.
dc.identifierhttps://hdl.handle.net/10568/142683
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/123456789/99761
dc.languageen
dc.publisherElsevier
dc.relationhttps://doi.org/10.1257/jep.31.1.49
dc.relationhttps://doi.org/10.1093/wber/lhm002
dc.relationhttps://doi.org/10.3386/w22854
dc.relationhttps://doi.org/10.4337/9781782543565.00013
dc.rightsOpen Access
dc.sourceShi, Xiangyu; Xi, Tianyang; Zhang, Xiaobo; and Zhang, Yifan. 2021. “Moving umbrella”: Bureaucratic transfers and the comovement of interregional investments in China. Journal of Development Economics 153(November 2021): 102717. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jdeveco.2021.102717
dc.subjectinvestment
dc.subjectcapacity development
dc.subjectland ownership
dc.subjectbureaucracy
dc.title“Moving umbrella”: Bureaucratic transfers and the comovement of interregional investments in China
dc.typeJournal Article

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