Designing Nonpoint Source Policies With Limited Information About Both Risk Attitudes and Production Technology

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dc.creatorPeterson, Jeffrey M.
dc.creatorBoisvert, Richard N.
dc.date2017-04-01T13:53:12Z
dc.date.accessioned2026-07-09T06:16:06Z
dc.descriptionA pollution reduction program is designed where information about both techno logy and risk preferences is asymmetric. Program costs and the distribution of payments depend on the amount of information known to the policy maker. Empirically testable conditions for selfselection are derived; the method is applied to reducing nitrate contamination.
dc.identifierdoi:10.22004/ag.econ.127661
dc.identifierhttps://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/127661/files/Cornell_Dyson_wp0113.pdf
dc.identifierhttp://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/127661
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/123456789/574414
dc.languageeng
dc.publisher
dc.sourcehttp://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/127661
dc.titleDesigning Nonpoint Source Policies With Limited Information About Both Risk Attitudes and Production Technology
dc.typeText

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