GREEN PAYMENT PROGRAMS FOR NONPOINT SOURCE POLLUTION CONTROL: HOW IMPORTANT IS TARGETING FOR COST-EFFECTIVENESS?

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dc.creatorBaerenklau, Kenneth A.
dc.date2017-04-01T13:52:35Z
dc.date.accessioned2026-07-09T04:11:52Z
dc.descriptionMechanism design theory is used to examine the case of a cost-minimizing regulator who uses input-reduction subsidies to meet an exogenously imposed ambient standard for nonpoint source pollution. A general result claimed for a welfare-maximizing equilibrium. Numerical results suggest the ability to directly target contracts reduces costs significantly for the regulator. But in the absence of this ability, indirect targeting reduces costs only slightly.
dc.identifierdoi:10.22004/ag.econ.31117
dc.identifierhttps://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/31117/files/27020406.pdf
dc.identifierhttp://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/31117
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/123456789/546286
dc.languageeng
dc.publisher
dc.sourcehttp://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/31117
dc.titleGREEN PAYMENT PROGRAMS FOR NONPOINT SOURCE POLLUTION CONTROL: HOW IMPORTANT IS TARGETING FOR COST-EFFECTIVENESS?
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