FIRMS, INCENTIVES, AND THE SUPPLY OF FOOD SAFETY: A FORMAL MODEL OF GOVERNMENT ENFORCEMENT

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dc.creatorGoldsmith, Peter D.
dc.creatorTuran, Nesve A.
dc.creatorGow, Hamish R.
dc.date2017-04-01T16:28:48Z
dc.date.accessioned2026-07-09T03:31:05Z
dc.descriptionRecent instances of significant food safety breeches in both meat and biotechnology challenge traditional safety efforts. A formal model utilizing agency theory is used to explore the power relationships between the regulator and the firm. Fundamental issues effecting firms' supply of safety are demonstrated and alternative corrective mechanisms are discussed.
dc.identifierdoi:10.22004/ag.econ.20343
dc.identifierhttps://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/20343/files/sp04go09.pdf
dc.identifierhttp://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/20343
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/123456789/534023
dc.languageeng
dc.publisher
dc.sourcehttp://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/20343
dc.titleFIRMS, INCENTIVES, AND THE SUPPLY OF FOOD SAFETY: A FORMAL MODEL OF GOVERNMENT ENFORCEMENT
dc.typeText

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