Product Quality and Grower Reputation: Dynamic Contracts With Adverse Selection
| dc.creator | Wang, Yanguo | |
| dc.creator | Jaenicke, Edward C. | |
| dc.date | 2017-04-01T18:42:28Z | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2026-07-09T03:28:08Z | |
| dc.description | We investigate the design of a two-period contract between an agricultural processor and growers whose quality-ability types are not observable to the processor. After characterizing the optimal contracts and establishing conditions for a separating equilibrium, we investigate how a payment based on first-period reputation may induce more first-period effort. We show that this reputation-based payment can improve both the processor's and the grower's welfare, resulting in a dominant equilibrium. | |
| dc.identifier | doi:10.22004/ag.econ.19543 | |
| dc.identifier | https://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/19543/files/sp05wa04.pdf | |
| dc.identifier | http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/19543 | |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/123456789/533073 | |
| dc.language | eng | |
| dc.publisher | ||
| dc.source | http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/19543 | |
| dc.title | Product Quality and Grower Reputation: Dynamic Contracts With Adverse Selection | |
| dc.type | Text |