The Role of Risk and Risk-Aversion in Adoption of Alternative Marketing Arrangements by the U.S. Farmers

dc.creatorHu, Wu-Yueh
dc.creatorVukina, Tomislav
dc.creatorZheng, Viaoyong
dc.date2017-04-01T19:57:31Z
dc.date.accessioned2026-07-09T07:58:03Z
dc.descriptionAbstract The objective of this paper is to analyze the relationship between farmers’ risk-aversions and the riskiness of various agricultural enterprises to see which marketing arrangements would typically emerge. Relying on the basic agency theory model we hypothesize the prevalence of alternative marketing arrangements (AMAs) in situations with high-risk averse farmers and high-risk enterprises and the prevalence of spot (cash) markets for low risk-averse participants and less risky enterprises. Our empirical tests are carried out using the 2004 Agricultural Resource Management Survey (ARMS). The empirical results are largely supportive of the agency theory of contract choice.
dc.identifierdoi:10.22004/ag.econ.168930
dc.identifierhttps://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/168930/files/AE_20131212.pdf
dc.identifierhttp://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/168930
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/123456789/594180
dc.languageeng
dc.publisher
dc.sourcehttp://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/168930
dc.titleThe Role of Risk and Risk-Aversion in Adoption of Alternative Marketing Arrangements by the U.S. Farmers
dc.typeText

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