The (Bargaining) Power of Incentives: Cooperatives, For-Profit Firms and the Cost of Procurement

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dc.creatorBontems, Philippe
dc.creatorFulton, Murray E.
dc.date2017-04-01T19:03:39Z
dc.date.accessioned2026-07-09T03:29:58Z
dc.descriptionIn this paper, we show formally that cooperatives can possess an informational - and hence cost - advantage compared to For Profit Firms. This advantage is directly linked to the goal alignment between the cooperative and its members, and is influenced by the extent of income redistribution between members. Hence the standard practice of modeling the cooperative and the FPF as having identical cost structures appears to be theoretically unsound.
dc.identifierdoi:10.22004/ag.econ.20073
dc.identifierhttps://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/20073/files/sp04bo02.pdf
dc.identifierhttp://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/20073
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/123456789/533603
dc.languageeng
dc.publisher
dc.sourcehttp://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/20073
dc.titleThe (Bargaining) Power of Incentives: Cooperatives, For-Profit Firms and the Cost of Procurement
dc.typeText

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