AGRICULTURAL BANK EFFICIENCY AND THE ROLE OF MANAGERIAL RISK PREFERENCES
| dc.creator | Armah, Bernard Kaku Ndarku | |
| dc.creator | Park, Timothy A. | |
| dc.date | 2017-04-01T15:33:22Z | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2026-07-09T03:33:23Z | |
| dc.description | We investigate the objectives of agricultural bank managers and their impacts on bank efficiency. If managers are non-neutral toward risk, then banks may appear inefficient when they are not. We find non-neutrality toward risk and efficiency gains due to firm size, loan shares, asset shares, and share of market deposits. | |
| dc.identifier | doi:10.22004/ag.econ.20909 | |
| dc.identifier | https://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/20909/files/sparma01.pdf | |
| dc.identifier | http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/20909 | |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/123456789/535039 | |
| dc.language | eng | |
| dc.publisher | ||
| dc.source | http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/20909 | |
| dc.title | AGRICULTURAL BANK EFFICIENCY AND THE ROLE OF MANAGERIAL RISK PREFERENCES | |
| dc.type | Text |