FORWARD CONTRACTING SPECIFICATION THROUGH COLLECTIVE BARGAINING

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dc.creatorChin, Ming-Chin
dc.creatorWeaver, Robert D.
dc.date2017-04-01T19:51:34Z
dc.date.accessioned2026-07-09T03:29:48Z
dc.descriptionGame-based bargaining theory is presented to evaluate the potential of and stability of cooperative coalition among producers for enhancing producer returns and managing market price and income risk. Results clarify that collective bargaining can increase and stabilize producer profits when they face a single processor.
dc.identifierdoi:10.22004/ag.econ.20006
dc.identifierhttps://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/20006/files/sp04ch15.pdf
dc.identifierhttp://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/20006
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/123456789/533536
dc.languageeng
dc.publisher
dc.sourcehttp://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/20006
dc.titleFORWARD CONTRACTING SPECIFICATION THROUGH COLLECTIVE BARGAINING
dc.typeText

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University of Minnesota